

"A Critique of the Theory of the Praetorian State," in Giuseppe Caforio (ed) **The Sociology of the Military**, Cheltenham: Elgar (1998), pp. 156-182.

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[156] Amos Perlmutter's theory of the part which professionalism and praetorianism play in the relationship of the military apparatus to the modern state represents the "establishment" social science's summation regarding the nature of military coups and, in general, of the relationships between the military and the state. This theory continues a "revisionist" tradition of political analysis which questions whether the military apparatus is able to promote societal development. These doubts have been occasioned by such debacles for the establishment as the collapse of the Batista, Ky-Thieu, Pahlavi, Idi Amin, and Somocista regimes, and the immanent collapse of the Pinochet regime. As Samuel Huntington, himself an "old hand" in these matters puts it, "Perlmutter sets forth a comprehensive general framework for the analysis of modern civil-military relations" (in Perlmutter, 1977:x). Hence Perlmutter's theory warrants our close attention.

Our critique has three parts, corresponding to the elements of Perlmutter's theory. First we analyse Perlmutter's typology of nation-states, next his treatment of military interventions, and finally, his interpretation of the nature of the military apparatus itself. In each part a Marxist analysis is juxtaposed to Perlmutter's treatment of the issues at hand.

The Forms of the Capitalist State

A presupposition of the relationship between the military apparatus and the modern state is the form or forms of the state. The relationship and the form will correspond. Perlmutter proposes that there [156/157] have been four types of nation-state in existence since 1789: the classical type, the settler colonizing type, the colonial (i.e. colonized) type, and the revolutionary (national liberation) type. There are two major problems with this typology: first, it is not exhaustive, and second, it is ahistorical. These problems are perhaps due to Perlmutter's failure adequately to "combine the conceptual framework of social science and that of comparative history."^{1/}

When we say that the typology is not exhaustive, we mean that it suffers from significant omissions. Consider the metropole; clearly the "settler colonizing type" and the "colonial type" lie outside its domain. Does this mean that there are only two types of metropolitan nation-states -- classical and revolutionary? Hardly. Major omissions in Perlmutter's typology of the metropole include *absolutist states* such as the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, *multinational states* such as Great Britain, Canada, and Belgium, and *corporate states* such as Fascist Italy. And this is to focus our attention on the typological characterization

of the metropole of capital, let alone the periphery.^{/2/} Not even the legerdemain of Weberian ideal types can reduce these essentially differing types of the state to the "classical type" which, according to Perlmutter, has "a mature regime...; a stable, integrated, culturally homogeneous population; and undisputed territorial boundaries" (1977:26).

When we speak of ahistoricity, we mean that the dynamics of the historical process are reified -- conceptually frozen -- thereby significantly misrepresenting that process. The ahistoricity of Perlmutter's proposed typology is thoroughgoing. Consider the "colonizing" type. Settler colonialism is the spawn of metropolitan capitalism's sphere of circulation. Yet there are indisputable stadial differences among settler colonialisms -- differences which cannot be glossed over by an uncritical invocation of Louis Hartz's concept of "fragment cultures" (Perlmutter, 1977:27). For instances, there are the settler colonies spawned during the stage of mercantile capitalism, such as the United States which has long since transcended settler colonial status to become a hegemonic nation in the imperialist stage.^{/3/} Then there are the settler colonies consolidated during the stage of imperialism, such as South Africa which reflects the *unity* of Anglo-Dutch imperialism while remaining in essence a settler colony (cf. e.g. Bunting, 1964). Again, there are the settler colonies spawned during the era of fascist pluralism, such as the Zionist [157/158] colony in Palestine which reflects the radical pluralism of fascism in its theocratic and ethnic racism and separatism, even though remaining in essence an outpost of imperialism.^{/4/}

In sum, Perlmutter's typology of nation-states is inadequate, since some nation-states are left out, and others which have been included simply don't fit. Indeed, the typology has little to recommend it except its apologetic value of associating Zionism with the "mission-oriented values" of the North American and Australian nation-states, and overlooking the much closer affinities of Zionism with the values of the South African Broederbond. Consider, then, as an alternative the following schematic of an historical and materialist analysis (cf. also Hobsbawm, 1975).

As Marx and Engels point out in *The German Ideology*, the specificity of any *social formation* has several aspects, including (a) the population, which is geographically distributed (i.e. has extension) and has a particular composition (intension), (b) its productive organization, which is its "definite mode of life" (*Lebensweise*) or structure of collective activity, involving (c) its means of production and "technology" which has a particular level of development (extension) and variety and efficiency (intension), and finally (d) its natural environment and other external exigencies, which are humanity's geological, hydrographical, climatic, and other conditions of existence (cf. Marx and Engels, 1975, Vol. 5:42).

There were three stages in the development of the productive organization of world capitalism during the Nineteenth Century. As the century began, the stage

of *mercantile capitalism* was the embodiment of progress *vis a vis* its feudal precursor. Notable formations of this stage were *absolutist states* and *nation-states* in the metropole of capital, and *settler colonies* in the periphery. Examples of the former would be Spain or Great Britain; of the latter, Quebec, Jamaica, or later, Algeria.

By the late 1820's, the emergence of the metropolitan business cycle had demonstrated that mercantile capitalism was being superseded by a second stage of capitalism, that of *competitive capitalism* with its atomism and mechanism. Some of the hitherto peripheral entities, e.g. the United States, were assimilated into the metropole in their own right, while *protectorates* became a notable formation in the periphery.^{5/} Examples of the latter include Aden, China, Egypt, and much of Latin America (under the "Monroe Doctrine").

Finally, by the 1880's, several of the most advanced capitalist [158/159] nation-states began to partition and repartition the remainder of the globe. They did so on behalf of the horizontally integrated trusts and monopolies in the means-of-production and energy producing sectors of their economies. This signalled that competitive capitalism was being superseded in turn by a third stage of capitalism, that of *finance capitalism* or *imperialism*. Major formations of this stage were *imperialist states* in the metropole of capital, and *colonies* in the periphery. Examples of the former would be the United States or Wilhelmine Germany; of the latter Puerto Rica, Tanganyika, or Cochin China. Between the two major kinds of forms were a number of "transitional forms," such as the protectorates, the settler colonies, etc.^{6/}

By the early 1920's, the internal contradictions of imperialism had caused the collapse of one of the major if somewhat lesser-developed imperialist states, Tsarist Russia. Through the military debacle of World War I and the successful Great October Revolution of 1917, the interdependency between Russia and the other imperialist states was ruptured and this state entered a new societal sphere which superseded capitalism altogether. This new sphere was that of socialism. Major formations of this sphere have proved to be *soviet socialist republics* and *peoples' democratic republics*. (See Afanasyev, 1980:130. On the latter formation, see Marx and Engels, 1975, Vol. 6:294-295, 350.)

By the early thirties, trade union organizations and progressive political parties threatened to repeat the socialist revolution in several of the remaining imperialist states. This tendency was violently suppressed on behalf of the (by now) vertically integrated oligopolies of those states; this gave the appearance that imperialism was being superseded by a fourth stage of capitalism, the stage of *fascism*.^{7/} Notable formations of this "stage" were the *corporate states* and their "internal colonies." Examples were Nazi Germany, clerical-fascist Portugal, etc. In actuality, however, the radical pluralism of fascism was unable to overcome (during World War II) the unity of Anglo-American imperialism when the latter was conjoined with the forces of the socialist sphere. Thus the stage of

imperialism has remained the preeminent stage of productive organization of the capitalist sphere throughout this century.

By the middle Fifties, the exhaustion of Anglo-American imperialism in its defeat of fascist pluralism, conjoined with the vitality of national liberation forces everywhere, rendered the colonial forms [159/160] untenable for imperialist control. By the same time, developments in means of communication -- in electronic technology and computational capacity, etc. -- made these forms unnecessary as well; the periphery of the imperialist sphere has been transformed into a set of *neocolonies* with little more than nominal sovereignty (cf. Nkrumah, 1966). Examples include Indonesia, Kenya, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Zaire. At the same time, the exhaustion of imperialism, conjoined with revolutionary forces, expanded the socialist sphere to include Angola, Cuba, Mozambique, Vietnam, etc.

This developmental analysis of Nineteenth and Twentieth Century capitalism can be schematized as follows:

| Date | Stage | Metropolitan Form | Peripheral Form | |
|------|------------------------|---|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1800 | Mercantile capitalism | Absolute states/ Nation states | Settler colonies | |
| 1820 | | | | |
| 1860 | Competitive capitalism | Nation states | Protectorates, etc. | |
| 1880 | | | | |
| 1920 | Finance capitalism | Imperialist states | Colonies | |
| | | | Corporate states | Internal colonies |
| | | | | Neocolonies |
| 1945 | | | | |

↓ ↓
To the socialist sphere

Figure 1.

[160/161] This schema should not be hypostatized. There is always a measure of fluidity both in the extension and the intension of such categories. For instance, when Stephen Decatur attacked the North African ports (the so-called "Barbary Coast") in the early Nineteenth Century, evidence was thereby given that a settler colony could be transformed into a metropolitan nation-state, namely the United States.

Now that we have schematized an historical analysis of the forms of the state under capitalism, let us consider the terms in which Perlmutter situates the praetorian state. He conceives praetorianism in a larger framework which lies directly in the tradition of bourgeois political science associated with the names of Roberto Michels, James Burnham, et al. In his discussion of modern authoritarianism, Perlmutter indicates that he has "established four fundamental modern authoritarian models: the party-state, the police state, the corporatist state, and the praetorian state" (1981:28). More types! Hence the praetorian state is a species of the *genus* authoritarian state. What is the authoritarian state? Perlmutter provides a definition: "Authoritarianism is a system of relationships between state and society and between political and societal sources of power. It is based on a type of domination which is dependent on centralized executive control and coercion" (1981:24). Furthermore, this "system" is a polar type, to be contrasted to the "democratic regime." Specifically, it has two essential components: a *political elite* and a set of *political organizations* which "politicize society," institutions which "subordinate politics to policy" (Perlmutter, 1981:7-8).

Within these terms, Perlmutter has sought abstractly to differentiate the Nazi, the fascist, and the corporatist models of the *genus* authoritarianism (1981:95-128). His attempt fails; he is forced to concede of Fascist Italy, for instance, that "Corporatism soon afterward became synonymous with fascism" (1981:112). He finally suggests -- quite off-handedly -- that praetorian, corporatist, (Mediterranean) Fascist, and Nazi "models" represent increasingly developed forms of the *genus*, where the military apparatus plays a decreasingly significant role in guaranteeing the political order.^{8/}

On his conception, there are three kinds of institutions which combine into the authoritarian state: the authoritarian party, the "bureaucratic-military complex," and the "parallel and auxiliary structures." As Perlmutter puts it, "The type of authoritarianism [161/162] is determined by the roles of the three instruments of authoritarianism." Each of the species of authoritarian state mentioned before, while employing all three institutions or "instruments," will favor one kind of institution over the others (Perlmutter, 1981:9, 24). The praetorian state, in particular, "draws its major support from the military establishment."^{9/} It is thus the relationship between the military apparatus and the state which is the crucial consideration in Perlmutter's conception of the praetorian state.

The Relation of Military Apparatus to the State

Perlmutter conceives the relationship of the military apparatus to the nation-state

in terms of the triadic interrelationship of that *apparatus*, the *political regime*, and the *political community*. So long as the interaction of the regime and the community is *stable*, he holds, the military apparatus will remain subordinate to the political regime. If the interaction of regime and community becomes *unstable*, then the military may intervene in the domestic political order. As we have seen, Perlmutter's typology of "nation-states," hence of the relationship between their political regimes and their communities, is inadequate for a cogent discussion of the modern world. Moreover, the notion of national "communities" within the capitalist sphere is a gross misrepresentation of the antagonistic structure of its productive organization. Thus the dichotomy of "stable" versus "unstable" interactions is merely an obfuscation of the real dialectic of the military apparatus in the various capitalist formations.^{/10/}

His abstract obscurantism becomes further evident when Perlmutter puts forth what he calls "sufficient explanations" for military interventions in civilian politics. A "military group replaces an existing regime ... when the military is the most cohesive and politically the best organized group ... [and] when no relatively more powerful opposition exists."^{/11/} There is little new or illuminating in Perlmutter's "axiomatics;" as Ruth First expressed it, "coups d'etat occur because governments are too weak to rule, but radical forces are too weak to take power" (1970:452).

This point, as well as the more general distinction between a military coup and a revolution, is implied by Lenin's *fundamental law of revolution*: a revolution can succeed when the lower classes will no longer bear the yoke and the upper classes are unable to carry on as before (Lenin, 1968, Vol. 31:85). When it is only an inability of the upper classes to rule, when the masses are not in a state of [162/163] revolutionary ferment, then the military apparatus can intervene.

Be that as it may, it is obvious that Perlmutter has only "explained" *successful* military coups, those circumstances when "a military group replaces an existing regime." But that doesn't explain anything at all, since he acknowledges that "regime vulnerability may be exploited by any organized political force, including the military" (Perlmutter, 1977:99; also Huntington, 1968: Ch. 4). He provides no explanation of why the military apparatus exploits "regime vulnerability" in this case; why some other "organized political force" exploits it in another case. Thus Perlmutter's analysis is not illuminating of the topic of the relationship of the military apparatus to the nation-state.^{/12/} We will now provide a preliminary reconsideration of these relationships in terms of the historical and materialist analysis of the formations of global capitalism already sketched out.

The relationship of the military apparatus to these capitalist formations is *essentially* one of the apparatus serving the interests of the capitalist class through the manipulation of violence towards the toiling masses (whether domestic masses or not). As one wag has put it, the Egyptian Army would have had more success in the Sinai if the tanks had turned their guns toward the east rather than

towards Cairo. The capitalist organization of the military apparatus to serve these interests is embodied in the "professional soldier" and the military bureaucracy. In part, Perlmutter concedes this: "the modern army is a bureaucratic army, just as the modern nation-state is a bureaucratic state." Again: "in most aspects of its development the modern professional military organization has generally emulated modern corporate organizations." And further: Perlmutter is "not implying that the modern professional officer type inhabits industrial-capitalist or modern societies exclusively ... [because] modern professional armies existed in noncapitalist, nonmodern states (like Prussia before 1848)."^{13/}

But Perlmutter also seems to equivocate on the point that the military apparatus serves the interests of the capitalist class. He cites Talcott Parsons' well-known claim that professionals are "neither 'capitalists' nor 'workers'" (Perlmutter, 1977:33; cf. also Parsons, 1954: Chs. 2 and 18). Parsons' theme is that the professions are a third stratum between the classes of capitalist society. But this is hardly the whole story -- as we know from the extensive discussion of *dritten Personen* in historical social science, the existence of a stratum is no evidence of the independence of that stratum. [163/164] "Existence" is an ontological consideration; "independence" is a relational one.

This essential relation of military apparatus to class (through the mediation of the state) is itself multiply contradictory; the military apparatus of any of these formations serves the interests of the metropole.^{14/} Perlmutter would surely dispute this: "in the modern nation-state the officer corps and the government bureaucracy as a whole are dependent on and responsible to their client, the regime" (1977:38). Consider, however, that both Shamir-Peres and Mubarak, for instance, represent regimes which are heavily staffed from their military organizations. Which depends on which -- military apparatus upon the regime or *vice versa*? Consider this further. The Camp David Accords internalized one aspect of the Middle East conflict within the US Department of State in Foggy Bottom. Meanwhile, US hegemony over the weapons systems internalizes the other aspect of the conflict within the US Department of Defense in the Pentagon, in the interests of the military-industrial complex. These aspects of the conflict create conditions of independence -- not for the "sovereign states" -- but for the military apparatus, in both instances independence from the regime itself.

Moreover, we take the military apparatus to be in an essentially antagonistic relation to the toiling masses of the particular formation.^{15/} The apparatus secondarily serves the interests of the national bourgeoisie or other national elites where those interests are distinct from -- and compatible with -- metropolitan interests. For instance, the military apparatus of the periphery can massacre peoples outside the sphere of capitalism, to the amusement or consternation of the metropolitans. This military resolution of the "natives problem" generates several antagonisms in turn; consider the recent Brazilian apparatus' policy of extermination directed toward the indigenous peoples of the Amazon basin, or the

current Guatemalan apparatus' genocidal policy towards the indigenous peoples there.

Where the interests of metropolitan and national bourgeoisie are conflictual, it is unlikely that the peripheral military apparatus will remain unitary. Recall the fate of the Argentine junta after the Malvinas (Falklands) conflict. As Michel Martin has stressed, such an apparatus is characterized by "fissiparite" -- the tendency to fission.^{16/} Internal struggles in a peripheral military apparatus tend to further metropolitan interests because of its technological dependency. Thus only exceptionally will the military apparatus will serve interests [164/165] other than metropolitan. Hence the rise of the "praetorian soldier," who is the personification of the servitude of the military apparatus to the metropolitan state and the interests it represents. A prime example was Field Marshal Idi Amin's regime which was supplied by Britain with liquor and other luxury goods for his officer corps, shipped in regular weekly flights from London to Entebbe until well into 1979, a few months before the Tanzanian invasion which toppled the "Conqueror of the British Empire" and his "Kleptocracy."^{17/} Little wonder, then, as William Thompson estimates, less than ten percent of all coup makers have *social reform* as a primary motive (1973:44-45). If reform is not their interest, what motivates the praetorian? Almost as an aside, Perlmutter corroborates that "political involvement of the [praetorian] officers may also be abetted by foreign intervention, such as the United States counterinsurgency training and military aid..." (1977:103). James Dickinson has commented (in a personal communication) that "other institutional connections to the metropole include, of course, the CIA role in teaching the military how to conduct a coup, since presumably military training does not include how to overthrow civilian (or military) governments."

By stressing the distinction between "historical" and "modern" authoritarianism, and between "historical" and "modern" praetorianism, Perlmutter pays lip service to his "conceptual framework of comparative history" while obscuring that praetorianism is essentially the promotion of imperialism, the imperial dynasty, the imperial rather than national interests. Thus the military *apparatchik* is indeed "Janus-faced," as Perlmutter is fond of pointing out. One important if overlooked aspect of this duality is the unity in opposition of the "professional" and the "praetorian" soldier, the duality of the bureaucratic routine and the charismatic coup. Neither element of this duality is primary *vis a' vis* the other; hence both are secondary to one other, which as we have seen is capitalism in its various forms.

What supersedes this dialectic of the professional/ praetorian military apparatus of the capitalist society of the periphery? No form of military coup alone will suffice, not even the so-called "progressive coup," because this continues the dialectic. The facility with which Nasser's "progressive" regime became Sadat's comprador regime is a case in point. Perlmutter presents some evidence that coups in the Middle East have been "more durable and [165/166] sustaining" when the army acts in concert with a political party. But what "endures," what is

"sustained," is purely formal; it has no necessary content (Perlmutter, 1977:165; cf. his 1981:133-4). Clearly, what supersedes the dialectic of the professional/praetorian military apparatus is the elimination of the apparatus itself, which eliminates the basis of the "man on horseback." There are two alternatives here.

The military apparatus is eliminated -- or, more properly speaking, is dialectically *sublated*, a process which at once supersedes and preserves -- either from within or from without. From within, the establishment of political cadres in each military unit representing the progressive political party subordinates the military apparatus to the state. From without, the success in civil war -- truly a war of national liberation -- of an egalitarian "peoples' army" *vis a' vis* the military apparatus will ensure the sublation of the apparatus. Let us attend to each of these alternatives.

The radical encadrement of the military apparatus tends to emerge in the revolutionary rupture of the metropolitan capitalist order. Under these conditions, the structure of the military's contradictory relations cannot simply be reduced to its antagonistic relationship to the domestic masses. Given more complexly contradictory relations, the possibility is enhanced of progressive forces emerging within the officer corps itself. This is particularly likely given defeat in imperialist war, which brings other antagonisms to the fore. These progressive forces become the officer corps of the "new army," always under the tutelage of the political cadres. An example of this is the Red Army following the Great October Revolution of 1917. What about the other alternative?

The replacement of the military apparatus *in toto* tends to emerge in the revolutionary rupture of the capitalist order in the periphery. The primacy of the military apparatus' antagonism towards the toiling masses conjoined with its metropolitan subservience if not outright loyalty, necessitates the liquidation of the officer corps, mercenaries, and career soldiery. The absence of an "external threat," the irrelevance of "defense," permit such a liquidation. Remaining conscripts, unofficered as they have thus become, can then be demobilized or else be absorbed into the successful peoples' army. Examples of this are the struggle of the Viet Minh and the Liberation Armed Forces peoples' armies against "Emperor" Bao Dai's comprador apparatus and ARVN, and the struggle of the Sandinista [166/167] National Liberation Front peoples' army against the Somocistan "Nicaraguan National Guard," a creature of the United States. Both the "new soldier" of the radically encadred military apparatus and the guerilla of the peoples' army are considered revolutionary soldiers.

The first appearance of such a revolutionary soldiery followed the Jacobin *levee* of 1792-1793.^{18/} This was both a politically encadred army and a "peoples' army." Its anti-capitalism was ill-defined due to the immaturity and progressive tenor of France's capitalism, although Babeuf and a few other visionaries saw beyond this. The revolutionary wars toppled the *ancien regime* in the Rhineland

as well as the Oriental despotism in Egypt, and occasioned the overthrow of settler colonialism and slavery in Santo Domingo. The same revolutionary wars led, tortuously and only after their messianic movement in Europe was stilled, to the insurrection in Buenos Aires and the national liberation of Latin America.

While Napoleon Bonaparte was willing to use the vast manpower embodied in these revolutionary armies, he bureaucratized them thus ensuring their compatibility with the developing capitalism. Napoleon, it must be recalled, was an officer from the artillery corps, and always preferred massed artillery barrages to masses of soldiers. Only by grossly overstating the significance of evidence such as the youthful Bonaparte's 1794 publication *Souper de Beaucaire*, which is more a reflection of the progressive era than a genuine tendency in Bonaparte's opportunism, can he be represented as a revolutionary (Soboul, 1974:610).

A second appearance of the revolutionary soldiery followed the Prussian defeat of Bonaparte III at Sedan on September 2, 1870. The collapse of the Second Empire led to the proclamation of the Republic on September 4 and the popular defense of besieged Paris against the Prussians. Confronted by the treachery of President Adolphe Thiers and General Louis Trochu on behalf of French capitalists and Bismark's forces, the Parisian working people declared the world-historic Commune de Paris in March 1871. The draft and the standing army were immediately abolished, replaced by the Garde nationale (the Republican Federation of the National Guard), constituted of all able-bodied Parisian citizens. "Armed Paris" held out against the traitorous Thiers in Versailles until the end of May. Finally, some 40,000 Commune men, women, and children, by then disarmed, were massacred by the erstwhile Bonapartist troops, [167/168] Prussian prisoners of war released to Thiers by Bismark (cf. Jellinek, 1965). The forms of military organization established in 1871 became influential models for the later Russian revolutionary forces.

Having discussed the forms of control over the military forces in a country subsequent to a revolutionary rupture with capitalism, we now return to the topic of the essential characteristics of the military apparatus within the various social formations of capitalism.

The Military Apparatus and Social Reproduction

Let us briefly consider the catastrophic failure (mentioned at the onset) of the ideology which informed the imperialist establishment's dependence upon military regimes for "development." That ideological failure has necessitated the current "revisionism." By the early Sixties, Huntington had proposed a typology of the officer corps which distinguished career *versus* non-career officers on the one hand, and the management of violence *versus* "non-military skills" on the other hand. In the era of national liberation movements, the "violence managers" would "stabilize" an "emerging nation" while development would be facilitated by those with "non-military skills." Indeed an entire doctrine of "civil action" conjoined with "counter-insurgency" activities of the military apparatus began to

emerge in these terms (cf. Huntington, 1963:785-6; Glick, 1966). This doctrine failed on at least two counts: it overestimated the numbers and roles of those members of the officer corps possessing "non-military skills" and more importantly it overlooked the common situation that the officer corps had with other occupations, whatever the career aspirations and skill types of its officers. As Perlmutter, Huntington, and others have noted, the military *apparatchik* is a bureaucratized professional. Hence we will focus our attention there.

First, we should point out Perlmutter's excessive dependence upon the Weberian theory of bureaucracy. As far as the domestic police activities of the military apparatus are concerned, Michael Buren has noted the inappropriateness of Weber's analysis, embodying as it does "unquestioned assumptions based on the bureaucratic ethic of business organizations." As far as external military activities are concerned, Janowitz and Little have emphasized that "the combat soldier is hardly the model of Max Weber's ideal bureaucrat following rigid rules and regulations."^{19/} Since Weber's time -- and we should [168/169] recall he died in 1920 -- the conception of the military apparatus has been radically revised by the recognition of the role of the "informal group," a distinctly non-Weberian conception (cf. Stouffer, 1949:130 ff). Hence Weber's ideal-typical theory is of questionable pertinence to the topic at hand.

Second, this Weberian conception is ahistorical, assuming as Weber did that the monocratic bureaucracy was the *terminus* of organizational development (Weber, 1978:987-9). A more historical understanding than Weber's would have recognized that the Prussian "legal-rational" bureaucracy emerged from the bourgeois struggle against nepotism and other dynastic tendencies of feudal-Junkerdom, i.e. under specific historical and material conditions.

Third, this Weberian conception is part of a mechanistic ideology reflecting the emergence of the high and extensive division of industrial labor in detail under competitive -- and then finance -- capitalism. It is thus not surprising that it is the contemporaries, Weber and Frederick Taylor -- who are identified as the luminaries of the "classical" school of organization theory, viewing people as mechanically functioning at their tasks.^{20/} Moreover, the social and historical ground of this "school" -- the mechanical nature of its ideological reflection -- has been fully demonstrated (cf. Sohn-Rethel, 1978: Pt. 3).

Finally, the wholesale importation into the discussions of the Arab nation of the Weberian particularities -- which after all reflect a national-chauvinism obsessed about the survival of the Wilhelmine Reich, caught as it was geopolitically between the British and the Tsarist Russian Empires -- is an hypostatization of the first order. These particularities may be germane to Zionist apologetics -- for which Perlmutter is well known -- but hardly to the general problem of the relationship of the military apparatus to the various metropolitan and peripheral formations of capitalist society.

By contrast, let us now examine the concrete types of reproductive occupations in bourgeois society as they are characterized in classical social theory. The domain of social activity -- of *praxis* -- is partitioned, in classical social theory, into *productive* activities and *reproductive* activities (for previous discussions of these topics see Welty, 1978; Marx, 1963:288). The former activities are productive of surplus value; the latter, whether or not necessary for the production of such value, are activities which are *not* directly productive of such value. Perlmutter, perhaps unwittingly, acknowledges that the military [169/170] officer is a "nonproducer" (Perlmutter: 1977:36). But this should not be taken to mean that the military apparatus does not engage in reproductive activities. These reproductive activities are *formally* nonproductive and tend *substantively* to be reproductive of the working class and class relations.

It is evident that the military apparatus, when acting domestically -- its activities ranging from police functions up to the conduct of civil war -- is both formally and substantively engaging in reproductive activity.²¹ When acting externally to the state-entity, however, the military apparatus neither directly nor substantively engages in reproductive activity. Its activity is instead *reflected*: we will consider in turn its action in imperialist adventures *vis a' vis* the periphery, and then its action in inter-imperialist wars.

First, consider imperialist adventurism. These activities of the military apparatus, even though external to the imperialist state, are nonetheless reflected back into the substantive reproduction of domestic class relations through the subsequent transfer of imperialist superprofits. Some "third roaders," romantic populists, etc. have supposed that these superprofits serve the interests of the entire metropolitan working class, or the white portion of the working class, rather than -- as Lenin took pains to argue -- those of the imperialists and a limited "labor aristocracy." These romantic suppositions are oblivious to the distributional issues which such a transfer implies (cf. e.g. Amin, 1977:77-78). Until the institutional forms of such transfers to the entire working class (or the white portion of the working class) have been explicated and demonstrated, we must conclude with Lenin that the recipients of superprofits are limited to the capitalists and their labor lieutenants (Lenin, 1968, Vol. 22:276 ff). This serves to enhance class relations in the metropole.

Moreover, these imperialist adventures secure strategic raw materials and cheap means of subsistence for the metropole. Both these aspects -- the necessity of exporting capital to secure imperialist superprofits and the necessity of controlling the supply of raw materials -- must be taken as two sides of a dialectical unity. Lenin, for instance, stressed the former and noted the latter aspect, while Bukharin, writing under Lenin's tutelage, noted the former and stressed the latter aspect (Lenin, 1968, Vol. 22:240 ff and 260-1; Bukharin, 1929:40-46 and Ch. 6; also Cohen, 1973:25 ff). Bukharin explicitly rejected Karl Kautsky's thesis that imperialism was solely the metropolitan tendency to expand into agrarian

countries in order to [170/171] acquire control over raw material sources (Luxemburg and Bukharin, 1972:254).

By lowering the value of these agricultural and other raw materials, of course, the socially necessary labor time for the metropolitan production of any other commodity tends to be lowered as well, while the "standard of living" of the metropolitan working class remains constant. For example, the world-wide rise in petroleum prices since 1973, led by Venezuelan and Indonesian pricing decisions, has raised socially necessary labor time and lowered the "standard of living" of the metropolitan working class. Thus the external activity of the military apparatus, in its reflection, serves the substantive reproduction of the working class and enhances class relations in the metropole.

Next, consider inter-imperialist wars. These military activities of any two imperialist states will tend to be internal to (at least) one of the states. In that abstract sense, the activities of the military apparatus are *not* external to the imperialist state. "Enlist now; defend the fatherland!" This is the ground of social chauvinism, whereby the activities of the military apparatus become directly constitutive of the working class, not only in the sphere of ideology but in class struggle as well.^{/22/}

At another level, imperialist war decimates the metropolitan working class, and particularly the natural leadership stratum of that class.^{/23/} This cripples that generation in its subsequent domestic class struggles.

Moreover, the "victorious" nations of imperialist wars show a higher birthrate after the cessation of hostilities than do the "vanquished" nations (Ulanis, 1971:255-260). This domesticates and places additional burdens upon the working class of the "victorious" nation. All these facilitate the post-war reestablishment of exploitative relations; thus the reflection of inter-imperialist military activity substantively reproduces the metropolitan working class and the class relations.

Now that we have established that the activities of the military apparatus are included within the domain of social reproduction, we can consider the nature of bourgeois control of that apparatus. The issue of control involves questions of social interests and societal needs. In whose interests is control exercised? What societal needs does the control address? [171/172]

Bourgeois Control of the Military Apparatus

The domain of reproductive activity as defined above includes both implicit and explicit institutions. The "family" is the implicit institution, subordinate to other institutions and organizations in civil society (cf. Welty, 1978:9).

Of the explicit institutions of reproductive activity (including the military apparatus), either (a) members of the working class and the toiling masses

perceive themselves as needing the services which these activities constitute, or (b) they perceive themselves *not* to need those activities. In the first case, members of the working class and the toiling masses voluntarily seek the services that are available, and those activities themselves are either (a') simply regulated (by "second order," as it were, bourgeois institutions -- the entrepreneurial professional school and the licensing board, etc. such as the occupation of dentistry)^{/24/} or else (a") they are unregulated (such as the occupation of coppersmith) or they are only adventitiously licensed (such as the occupation of rainmaker). As we have noted elsewhere, the uniform extension of licensing of occupations such as physicians and optometrists, and the variable extension of licensing of other occupations such as taxidermists and phrenologists is a criterion of the qualitative distinction between "professions" *versus* "licensed occupations" as conventionally construed within a given social formation (Welty, 1978:12). The object of regulation for any occupation in this case is the *form* rather than the *content* of the activity.

In the second case (b), where the members of the working class and the toiling masses do not perceive themselves to need the activities, these activities are *coercively* administered and bureaucratically controlled, whether or not they are also regulated by licensing boards (Welty, 1978:10). In this case, the object of bourgeois control is the *content* of the reproductive activity.

All of these distinctions of forms of bourgeois control within the domain of reproductive activity can be displayed as follows:




Figure 2.

Several characteristics of those reproductive activities which are bureaucratically controlled deserve our careful attention, since they pertain directly to the military apparatus. As we mentioned above, the relationships of the military apparatus mediated through the state are multiply contradictory. One of these is the relationship of the military professional to (his) clientele. *Coercion*, as an aspect of the [172/173] *internal relation* of professional to client, is in essence an antagonistic relationship. Another of these is the bureaucratic relationship of the military professional to the state apparatus. Bureaucratic control, as an aspect of the *exterior relation* of the professional to the state, is a contradiction in the "autonomy" (agency) of that reproductive activity. Thus those reproductive activities (such as those of the military apparatus) which are both professionalized (through professional schooling and commissioning) and bureaucratized -- are both subjectively (personally) and objectively (organizationally) *stressful* (Welty, 1978:10-11; also Kahn, 1964). How can this potentially disabling stress be moderated?

Particularly, the *balkanization* of an occupation of reproductive [173/174] labor resolves some of the subjective and objective contradictions of both the internal and exterior relationships of bureaucratized professions (Welty, 1978:11). These occupational contradictions come to be sublated by the "basic" contradictions which dominate the racist, sexist, or national chauvinist society. This balkanizes the bureaucratized profession whereby the occupational antagonism becomes a "non-basic" contradiction. (on these categories of contradiction, see Afanasyev, 1980:89-90.) For example, the "client" can be clearly identified with the regime rather than the people (which is the object of coercion), through ethnically particular recruitment of the officer corps.

Let us consider briefly an instance of balkanization, the development of *age chauvinism* in the military apparatus. The possibility always exists that the progressive forces of an antagonistic society, perhaps by infiltrating the military apparatus itself, will mobilize the soldiery to revolt against the imperialist or neocolonialist state (cf. Chorley, 1973). On the one side, these progressive forces will have tactics and strategies to unify recruits or even some career soldiers with the masses (Lenin, 1968, Vol. 41:204-7). On the other side, the apparatus will develop counter-tactics and counter-strategies to maintain military discipline and control in the ranks.^{/25/}

These reactionary strategies and tactics are practiced in the face of the multiply contradictory and demoralizing demands placed upon the soldiery by the "professional autonomy" of the modern military apparatus on the one side and the bureaucratic demands for "shooting automata" on the other side.^{/26/} One of these reactionary strategies is that of enhancing age chauvinism which Karl Leibknecht defines as "artificially introducing by every means the distinction of class according to age" so as to diminish the unity of the soldiery with the toiling masses. Youth are structurally vulnerable to this manipulation because they are immanently leaving their parents' home, and do not yet have their own home and

family. Old social bonds are weakening; new bonds are yet to be established. Thereby youth from the working class and the toiling masses practice military violence against their own people and become "murderers of their own comrades and friends, of their parents, brothers, sisters, etc."^{27/}

This kind of balkanization, as well as all the others dictated by the complexly and multiply contradictory relationship of the military apparatus to the various formations of capitalist society, must be [174/175] studied in depth. Such studies are not conceptualized, let alone undertaken, in Perlmutter's theorizing. Indeed, the facile rationalization of "establishment" social science precludes such study.

Conclusion of the Critique

There are several ironic twists to Perlmutter's theorizing. As one illustration, rather than recognizing that Israel, South Africa, etc. are approximated in Harold Lasswell's conception of the "Garrison State," Perlmutter takes great pains to debunk that analysis (Lasswell, 1941; Lasswell, 1962; Al-Qazzaz, 1973:144 ff). Instead, Perlmutter follows David Ben-Gurion in proclaiming that the Zionist colony actualizes the *polis* of Hellenic thought (Perlmutter, 1977:251; also Perlmutter, 1970:51). This must be the apex of the ahistoricity of bourgeois thought ... until we recall that the *polis* was based upon the slave labor of "barbarians," captured in war.

In our reexamination of Perlmutter's theory of military professionalism and the praetorian state, we have uncovered several major and debilitating problems. These include his typology of nation-states, which most interestingly omits both multinational states and corporate states.^{28/} Perlmutter's analysis of settler colonialism is remarkably ahistorical and tendentious, blithely associating the colonization in the United States with the Zionist colony in Palestine, as well as overlooking the colonization of South Africa, Namibia, etc. Further problems include the nature of the relationship between the nation-state and the military apparatus. Perlmutter "explains" only successful military coups, and the conjuncture of social forces which precipitate a coup -- whether successful or not -- remains obscured; of course the etiology can be cloaked, masked if the event is agreeable. Finally, Perlmutter's typology of "professional," "praetorian," and "revolutionary" soldiers depends extensively and uncritically upon the Parsonsian and (even moreso) the Weberian doctrines of professions and organizations. The relevance of these doctrines is questionable, and the interrelationships of the three types of soldier are not scientifically developed in Perlmutter's theory. All of this leads us to the conclusion, to emend Huntington's encomium somewhat, "few scholars will accept Professor Perlmutter's argument ... " [175/]

Notes

1. Perlmutter (1977:21). This is, of course, Auguste Comte's programme (cf. Comte, 1839:450ff). The methodological issue is that Perlmutter's "framework of social science" is implicitly ahistorical as his "framework of comparative history"

is implicitly unscientific. Hence the explicit amalgam of the two frameworks will be jointly ahistorical and unscientific (i.e. neither exhaustive nor uniquely inclusive in its categories).

2. Alternatively, see the differentiation of the metropolitan states in V.I. Lenin (1968, Vol. 39:202)

3. For some of the themes of this transformation, see Wm. A. Williams (1969).

4. See Welty (1984). Perlmutter alludes to fascism -- "a much maligned concept" -- in the Middle East in (1981:108), but he limits himself to "Arab areas."

5. On "center" and "periphery," see Dickinson (1983:26-27); on "atomism," see Marx and Engels (1975, Vol. 4:418-443); on "protectorates," see Lenin (1968, Vol. 22, pp. 263-264). It is surely worth mentioning that Marx himself had sketched his conception of the praetorian state in an 1858 article in the *New York Daily Tribune* (cf. Marx and Engels, 1975, Vol. 15:464-467). After the 1789 Revolution, French ruling classes had frequently depended upon the armed forces to ensure their domination. Ultimately the inability of bourgeois democracy to correlate privatized interests with general interest -- of the class, let alone the society -- led to the breakdown of the political order: the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Under Napoleon III, then, the armed forces *became* the ruling class: this was to "represent the State in antagonism to the society" (ibid, 465).

6. See Welty (1984:63-64). This is the dialectical complement to Lenin's differentiation of the metropolitan states; see note 2 (above).

7. This is the theme of Dutt (1935). Vertical integration was not confined to the organization of means of production and the labor force alone; for the means of communication and the mass audience, see Benjamin (1969:244, note 8) on the passing of the silent motion picture and the rise of the radical pluralism of fascism.

8. Perlmutter (1981:124-126; also 156-157). Furthermore, since "authoritarian systems should be analysed along a continuum" (1981:8), this is a developmental continuum. Arab and North African regimes are praetorian, while Latin American regimes are corporatist (see 1981:124; also 130-132).

9. Perlmutter (1981:41). Furthermore, "the military is obviously the locus of power in the praetorian state" (1981: 41, cf. also 132).

10. Moreover, the dichotomy of "stable" versus "unstable" has little explanatory value in its own right; see Yough and Sigelman (1976).

11. Perlmutter (1977:100; see also his 1981:129): "Praetorianism occurs when the military elite, or a segment of it, seeks to maximize its political influence in the

absence of a serious political and structural rival and an effective elite organization."

12. On the tautological nature of much of these "sufficient explanations," see Rude' (1964:266 ff). This absence of illumination is hardly alleviated by invoking an "urge to power" as does Lissak (1973:71).

13. Perlmutter (1979:24, 10, and 10-11). Strictly speaking, of course, the "modern professional military organization" cannot be said to "emulate" something which it *preceded*; it perhaps goes without saying that "corporate" here is to be distinguished from "corporatist."

14. See Nordlinger (1970). Perlmutter in fact argues that this is the case, but only for Latin American "corporatism;" see (1981:151-152).

15. Johnson (1958); also Nun (1967). Perlmutter concedes of the military apparatus on the periphery that "New professionalism responds primarily to problems of internal security" (see 1981:123).

16. Martin (1973); see also Gregory Bateson's (1936) discussion of processes of "schismogenesis."

17. The latter term is Stanislav Andreski's characterization of a "government of thieves"; see his (1968: 110-133).

18. Soboul (1974:Pt. 2). Thus the "emergence of mass armies" is categorically *not* the "Napoleonic innovation" proposed by Perlmutter (1977:30).

19. Buren (1975:229-30) ; Janowitz and Little (1965: 42). The disposition of the perpetrators and abettors of the My Lai massacre of March 1968 (cf. Peers, 1979), the Operation Litani massacre of March 1978 (cf. "Operation Litani" *Jerusalem Post* No. 967 (May 1979)), the Sabra and Shatila massacres of September 1982 [cf. Kapeliouk (1982) and *The Beirut Massacre* NY: Claremont Research and Publications(1982)], and similar military "excesses" against unarmed civilians, is strong evidence on behalf of both the scientific inappropriateness of Weber's doctrine, and the officer corps' recognition in practice of this inappropriateness.

20. Cf. Roberts (1974:504). The "division of labor" between Weber and Taylor was less developed than one might expect. Weber, for instance, did not limit himself to the organization of "mental labor" alone; see his "Psychophysik der Industriellen Arbeit" (1924).

21. Welty (1975:253 ff); much of the immediately following pertains to the foreign service officer as an occupation of reproductive activity as well.

22. Lenin (1968, Vol. 21:15 ff); symptomatic is Bernstein (1961:169 ff); see also Lewis Richardson's (1946) discussion of "the doctrine of mutuality."
23. Willis (1975); also see Lutterman, Russell and Zeitlin's research on combat deaths of American servicemen in Vietnam, reported in M. Zeitlin (1970:174-5). We have benefited from our discussions with Jim Russell on this topic.
24. It should not be supposed that entrepreneurial organization is necessary for *any* reproductive occupation; see, for instance, Blendon (1979:1457-8).
25. The observations in Weber's address to the Officer Corps of the Austro-Hungarian Royal Imperial Army can be taken as illustrative; see Eldridge (1971:191 ff). History has proved Weber quite nearsighted here.
26. The term is Karl Leibknecht's; see his (1972:24). He was presumably following Dugald Stewart's characterization of workingmen under capitalism as "living automatons;" see his (1855:318).
27. Leibknecht (1972:20, also 25 ff). For phenomenological insight into the relationship of age chauvinism to fascism, cf. Adorno (1969: Ch.17, esp. 691). Perlmutter almost attains these insights in his discussion of the Nazi youth culture; see his (1981:99 ff; also 110).
28. Perlmutter (1977:27 and 184) does in passing mention "the twentieth-century totalitarian state" and "fascism" which stood for "modernism and revolution."

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