Jewish Affairs (September 1989), Vol. 19:3, pp. 22-24.

Reviewed by Gordon Welty
Wright State University
Dayton, OH 45435 USA

[/22] Yehoshafat Harkabi's book has created quite a stir in the West. This is perhaps due more to who Harkabi is, than to what the book says. He is a sabra, a specialist in Arabic literature, fought in the 1948 War, a retired Israeli general, advisor on military intelligence for several Labor governments as well as for Begin. He is presently Professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

During the Sixties, he authored Arab Attitudes to Israel (Keter, 1972) as well as the complementary booklet The Attitude of Israel in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Devir, 1967). During this decade Harkabi coined the term "politicide" to characterize what he perceived as Arab intentions toward Israel. In the Seventies he published several books which studied the changing positions of the Arabs, Palestinians and Israel (Keter, 1974), Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (Free Press, 1977; hereafter AS&IR), and Winds of Change in the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Devir, 1978). Finally, the Eighties saw two more books, these focussing more on the inflexible positions of the Israelis. These were The Bar Kokhba Syndrome (Rossell, 1983) and the present volume, Israel's Fateful Hour.

Harkabi's most recent book has six chapters and five appendices. The first chapters discuss the Arab position and the Israeli position, respectively, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The third chapter addresses the ideological differences between Labor Zionism and Revisionist Zionism. The fourth recounts the "widespread deterioration of Israel's situation" in all aspects of life, due -- holds Harkabi -- to Likud's rise to power in 1977. The fifth chapter considers how the Jewish religious climate has been debased as a result of changes in the Israeli political (nationalistic) climate since the 1967 War. The final chapter weighs policy alternatives which might prevent Israel from committing what Harkabi calls "national suicide." The Appendices reprint documents pertinent to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including UN Resolutions 242 and 338, the Fez Summit Declaration, the Camp David Accords, etc.

The book may be particularly helpful for those whose ideological or chauvinistic preconceptions have inhibited deep inquiry into the conflict and the future of Israel. Harkabi considers, for instance, Why there is a PLO? What is the significance of anti-Zionist terrorism? etc. Of course these points demonstrate that there is someone for Israel to negotiate with regarding peace and justice in the Middle East, namely the PLO. These points demonstrate that various charges against the Palestinians -- such as "terrorism" -- represent Israeli (and, by implication, US) "distortion at the highest political level" (p.99) and should not inhibit negotiations.

Harkabi's theme is that there are two fundamental positions on the Arab side, and two on the Israeli side. On each side, one position is "radical" or "extremist," the other is "moderate." An example of an Arab extremist, for Harkabi, is George Habash; an Arab moderate, Anwar Sadat; an Israeli extremist, Meir Kahane; an Israeli moderate, Amnon Rubenstein (perhaps). Harkabi undoubtedly considers himself to be a moderate.

What is the essence of these positions? In content, Harkabi contends that the radical position is maximalist, advocating Eretz Yisrael and Pax Israelica on the one side, and the destruction of the state of Israel on the other. The moderate position, he holds, promotes a negotiated settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, one which would involve compromise on both sides, and ultimately two states coexisting within historical Palestine.

In terms of form, the radical position is self-standing, depending upon no other position. By contrast, the moderate position by definition implicates a position on the other side. The radical position has a more ready audience and is more fully developed -- ideologically and politically -- on both Arab and Israeli sides, than the moderate position.

But Harkabi does not employ these concepts consistently. At one point he observes that Israeli "hard-line policies" have led to a "de facto alliance with the Arab radicals" (p.12). Thus, for Harkabi, Israeli extremism and Arab extremism are mutually supportive (cf. also p.122). Subsequently he holds that "Arab extremists tend to support the view of Israeli moderates" while "Arab moderates tend to support Israeli extremists" (p.55). Thus, for Harkabi, radicalism on the one side and moderation on the other are mutually supportive.

Nor does he apply these concepts accurately. In what sense can the fundamentalist Islamic Jihad movement of Gaza (p.40) be usefully equated with the Palestinian CP (p.xvii), whereby both are "extremist"? A decade ago, Harkabi distinguished between these (AS&IR, pp. 73-76). [22/23] These inconsistencies and inaccuracies appear to be due more to the inadequacies of the concepts themselves, than to shortcomings or clumsiness on Harkabi's part. He had used "radical" and "moderate" before (e.g. AS&IR, p. 39, 48, 57, 98-99), but not categorially. Harkabi's "radical" and "moderate" echo US Department of State language, wherein "friends" are characterized as "moderate" and opponents become known as "radical."

In the past (in AS&IR, for instance), he had analysed the situation in terms of a triad of Arab positions and a triad of Israeli positions. While that typology is somewhat dated, and the methodology employed suffers from the same subjectivism that infuses his current work, the earlier effort is more satisfying than the "radical" and "moderate" of the present book. As we shall see, however, there is a more fundamental set of categories than "radical" and "moderate," categories which are lurking within Harkabi's discussion, categories which would permit him more coherent and more accurate analysis.

These are the categories which characterize the bourgeois parties in the era of imperialism, in the era of the general crisis of capitalism. Such parties are either founded on a bourgeois base, such as the Liberal Party in England, or else they include substantial pre-capitalist or religious tendencies in their base, as does the Conservative Party in England. Hence the category-scheme is not unitary, but multi-dimensional. Of course this lack of categorial unity reflects both the difference between the base and the political superstructure of capitalist society, as well as the divisions within the capitalist ruling class regarding the distribution of surplus value.

Each bourgeois party can be classified as either Modernist, established on a bourgeois political base, or else as Traditionalist, incorporating clerical elements in its base. Its political programme will reflect the interests of its political base. And then the party can be located along a political continuum, depending upon the facility with which it will overturn the bourgeois Constitution, the "Fundamental Law," in order to preserve privilege of the propertied few. The fewer its compunctions about overturning the Constitution, the more rightward the party. Starting from the extreme right-wing of the political spectrum, then, the Modernistic categories would range from Nazi-type, through Fascist-type, to Conservative-type parties, and, in parallel, the Traditionalistic ones would range from Clerical-fascist type, through `Christian' Democratic-type, to `Christian' Socialist-type parties.

Harkabi could make more sense of his evidence in terms of political categories such as these. For instance, he points out that Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the founder of Revisionist Zionism, was "inspired by Marshal Pilsudski" (p.135) -- that is, the proto- Fascist Polish strongman, Josef Pilsudski -- and indicates that the "overblown nationalism" of Pilsudski's Poland and Fascist Italy (cf. p.214) "greatly influenced Jabotinsky" (p.76). This is suggestive that the original Revisionist Zionism should be categorized at least as a Fascist-type bourgeois party. When we recall the charge by Albert Einstein and other eminent Jews in the late `40's that Menahim Begin was a Fascist, the proposed categorization is supported in later periods as well. When Harkabi recounts the struggle of Yitzhak Shamir's faction of the Revisionists to ally itself with Nazi Germany (p.214), the categorization is even further corroborated. Finally, when we remember the contemporary Israeli pundits' assertion that Kahane's Kach Party is the truth of Geula Cohen's and Yuval Ne'eman's Tehiya Party, while Tehiya is the truth of Begin's and Shamir's Likud, the categorization seems appropriate indeed.

But, it may be remarked, Likud is a coalition, including not just Herut, but also junior partners. The populist rhetoric and orientation, and petty bourgeois base of Herut is balanced by its Likud partner, Yitzhak Mo'dei's Liberal Party, which as Harkabi acknowledges "represents the high bourgeois" (p.111). Fascist parties and movements characteristically combine the representatives of the declasse, the petty bourgeois, as well as those of the hegemon, the big capitalists, bankers, etc. And Likud seems to be no exception.

The same kind of analysis would permit the categorization of the partners in the Labor Alignment -- Mapai, etc. -- somewhat more toward the center by comparison to Herut, but a categorization as bourgeois parties nonetheless. Thus we find the differences between Labor and Likud to be distinctly differences subordinated within unity; and it is that unity which gives rise to the recent "National Unity" governments in Israel.

The case with reference to the movements, parties, etc. in the Arab world which Harkabi calls "radical" is somewhat more complex. This complication is due to the residual nature of his concept -- it is comprised of those he understands as `opponents' -- for whatever reason they might be opposed. Harkabi is not alone in such an understanding. According to the `logic' of the US Department of State, for instance, both socialist Cuba and the Islamic Republic of Iran are "radical." Rather than following a line of thought which will of necessity end up in bourgeois apologetics, one would do better to distinguish between progressive and reactionary anti-bourgeois or anti-imperialist movements. Again it is the political base -- the toiling masses or the landlords, clerics etc. -- and its social relations which establishes the politics of the [23/24] movement or party.

This bears upon Harkabi's discussion of policy alternatives in his concluding chapter, entitled "What is There to Do?" He calls for "realism," yet shows little understanding of the kind of social and economic struggle and transformation which Israeli society must undergo before the "Jabotinsky-Begin ethos" -- read Fascist mentality -- will be replaced by the mentality of "realism." Harkabi has acknowledged in the past that due to his approach, "the whole political drama is reduced to an intellectual tug-of-war between such metaphysical entities as ethereal schools of thought" (AS&IR, p.157). Or, as Marx and Engels once put it, it is reduced to a "battle of the books at the Leipzig book fair."

The necessary shift of mentalities will not come about simply as a result of intellectual debate -- nor even as a result of parliamentary debate -- although these activities may have some bearing upon the shift. Nor will it come about as a result of political realignments, a point Harkabi acknowledges (p.195). It is rather a more basic process which must be considered.

As the objective conditions of Israeli society continue to deteriorate, the necessity of extending the broad democratic struggle and the necessity of profound transformation of the entire society will become increasingly evident. Harkabi does note that "economic crisis has given the public a more realistic understanding of the limits of Israel's economic capacity. This can serve as the starting point for understanding the limits of military and political power and the constraints within which Israel must act" (p.199). And, we must add, that understanding must be more democratic. The direction of that democratic struggle, the direction of that profound transformation, can only be provided by the deepest understanding of the categories which reflect the movement of history. And those are not the conceptualizations of the US Department of State. Harkabi notes the "ideological vacuum in Israel" and continues "an ideology cannot be delivered on demand" (p.200); no matter how enthusiastically Foggy Bottom promotes its ideological wares, they are defective goods. The requisite terms are none other than the categories of historical materialism, i.e. Marxism.[24/]

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