"The 'Generation Gap'
Reconsidered." Global Youth, Peace,
and Development: The Role of Science and Technology in Contemporary Society,
Yedla C. Simhadri (ed), Delhi: Ajanta Publications, Vol. 1 (1991), pp. 383-399.
by Gordon Welty
Wright State University
Dayton, Ohio 45435 USA
[//383] The 'generation gap' has been widely discussed in
Western social science. This discussion is central to the topic of 'youth,'
since the 'generation gap' is a phenomenon which affects adolescents, youth
between puberty and adulthood.1
Adolescents are a group in transition between what the social scientist
calls their consanguine families and their conjugal families. On the one hand,
it is argued that their relatively weak attachment within the social structure,
their rapid organic and psychosexual development, etc. tend to orient them
towards social change. Thus a 'gap' can develop between them and their
relatively more stable elders. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that
their relative isolation from the processes of social production tend to make
youth suggestible, prey to reactionary doctrine. The conflict of generations is
by no means the harbinger of societal progress.
Some Modern Views of
the 'Generation Gap'
Lewis Feuer is a well-known proponent of the doctrine of the 'generation gap,'
holding that "generational conflict, generational struggle has been a
universal theme in human history."2 Indeed, Feuer has indicated that he seeks "to work
out a general law under which ... diverse generational phenomena" can be
subsumed.3 He has
attempted in particular to explain revolutionary change in the modern world --
the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, etc. -- not in terms of the
political consequences of class struggle, but in terms of the conflict of
generations. As an example of his scientific endeavors, Feuer presents the
"Law of the Generational Cycle." This 'law' characterizes an 18-20
year cycle of student {383/384] unrest in nineteenth century Russian
universities.4 Unfortunately
for his scientific pretensions, however, this is not a law, by any stretch of
the scientific imagination -- it is at best an empirical regularity. The
confusion of these two -- statistical patterns and scientific laws --
characterizes much of the discussion of the 'generation gap' in Western social
science.
In the late thirties, Kingsley Davis
provided a major contribution to the discussion of the 'generation gap.'5
His conception involved both biological ("universal") factors
and social factors, and sought thereby to explain "parent-adolescent
conflict." On the biological side, Davis included the "birth
cycle" (which he held to be "biological and inescapable," as
though the postponement of marriage was not a significant consideration), the
"constantly decelerating rate of socialization" from infancy to
adulthood (as though primary or
childhood socialization had no complement in secondary or adult socialization), and the contrast between a
generation "just reaching its full powers" and another "which is
just losing them" (a straightforward reification of the male's 'libidinal
energy'). On the social side, he included the rate of social change, the
cumulative nature of culture (resulting in a varying cultural content in the
time-span between generations), and the differing "social contexts" in
which persons of differing ages are enmeshed. These factors, Davis maintained,
were sufficient to explain "certain differences in orientation between
parent and youth," and thereby the conflict between generations. The stress
on the organismic, the biologic, to the point of overlooking the material and
historical basis of social phenomena is characteristic of much of the twentieth
century discussion of the 'generation gap.'
But this discussion is not simply a
peculiarity of twentieth century social thought. The topic of generations
in social science -- ignoring, for the most part, the issue of the 'gap' --
was considered at least as early as Auguste Comte, and was continued by John
Stuart Mill, Antoine Cournot, and Emile Durkheim; positivists all.6
The 'generation gap' was treated in the Germanic tradition as well. In
his hackneyed The Ego and His Own, Max Stirner wrote in 1844 that the 'youth' must
'vanquish' his parents, as a necessary stage of ontogeny.7
At a quite abstract level which anticipates [384/385] certain twentieth
century formulations of personality development, Stirner indicated that childhood
is the struggle for physiological self-control, for mastery in the
object-domain. Youth is the struggle
for affective and cognitive self-control. Adulthood
is the struggle to resolve the antithesis of childhood and youth in the
'embodied mind.' When he moves to the level of particulars, however, Stirner
suffers seriously from petty bourgeois narrowness. As Marx and Engels commented,
Stirner "inflates the consciousness predominant in the class nearest to him
in his immediate environment into the normal consciousness of 'a man's
life'."8 Thereby
he is inclined to conflate epiphenomena with phenomena and appearances with
essence.
Some Classical Views
of the 'Generation Gap'
Much earlier, social philosophers had recognized that the
relationship between the generations was complex and even contradictory.
Aristotle had maintained that the relationship between the generations was one
of the three basic relations of society, along with the relationship between the
sexes and that of master and slave (Politics,
1252 b 10-20). This relationship was the basis of natural domination, as the
elders 'naturally' ruled the younger -- a domination which he held no one found
disagreeable (1332 b 35). Yet Aristotle devoted considerable space to the
difference between youth and the elderly (Rhetoric
1389 a 2 - 1390 a 25). And Aristotle's comments to the effect that the education
of the youth should be the prerogative of the state, not the parents (1337 a
21-26), suggests that some 'gap' between the generations may have emerged even
in Classical times.
At about the same time, Mencius held that serving one's parents (filial piety) was the most important duty and the root of all other duties. One could fulfill this duty only if one maintained his integrity. This presupposed correct education; but the student's failure to follow the teacher's precepts could anger the teacher, and anger itself violated those precepts. Thus the student resented the teacher's hypocrisy. But Mencius pointed out that it was important that the generations not become alienated from one another. Hence he too recommended that the father not educate his son.9 [385/386]
These classical comments on the relationship between the generations are suggestive both of the etiology of the 'generation gap' and its remedy. The 'generation gap' tends to emerge with the antagonistic social order,10 with the development of property relations, as the child becomes the possession, the property of one (or even both) of the parents. As property, the child is an object to be used or abused -- to the extent it isobjectified, it is not a person to be humanly appreciated. The child's personal space -- sometimes referred to as 'personal property' in distinction from alienated 'private' and socialized 'public property' -- is negated by the elder's privated space or private property.
Let us consider two illustrations of this objectification.11
(1) William Mariner tells of a Tonga war party which committed sacrilege and
sought to appease the gods. The priest indicated that the child of a chief must
be sacrificed. A two-year old child was selected with the concurrence of his
father. His mother, importantly not a member of the ruling class, sought to hide
the child. He was discovered, the mother restrained, the child dutifully
strangled by two men. This is the objectification of the offspring in primitive
society. The child might as well have been a pigeon. (2) This objectification is
not always masked by religious ideology. Lawrence Stone relates the story of the
"man near Wakefield in 1674 who hanged his own child to death for taking a
piece of bread to eat it; another child said, 'father, you'll not hang me, I
took no bread'." This is the bottomless degradation of early capitalism,
the objectification of youth in our own antagonistic society.
The contradiction between youth as person and as property
carried over into the educational process. As a person, the child was to be
nurtured; as an object, it was to be molded. As the child matured, achieved
self-mastery, became a youth, the contradictory relationships with the older
generation became the source of resentment. In the United States today, where
over 90% of parents hit their children, youth retaliates violently.12
In American schools, teachers acting in
loco parentis inflict corporal punishment on an estimated million students
annually; in return, over 200 teachers are physically assaulted by students each
day.
These contradictions, so destructive of familial and
intergenerational relations, tended to be displaced to the level of [386/387]
the community and the state. This is reflected in Mencius' proposal to alleviate
domestic intergenerational hostility by shifting it from the family to the wider
community, where the relationship would be simply generational, not kinship. It
is also reflected in Aristotle's proposal to ensure 'natural' domination by
homogenizing the educational process, hence the educational product, within the
state apparatus. But neither of these proposals are sufficient for the
resolution of the contradictions, which requires that society self-consciously
transcend the holding of child and youth as parental property. Neither Aristotle
nor Mencius ever attained that insight, due to the social conditions under which
they thought and wrote.
The position of youth within the
antagonistic social order is not an enviable one. They are clearly oppressed in
their upbringing. Their natural curiosity is stifled, their gregariousness
misdirected, their learning corrupted, their minds filled with superstition,
sexism, racism, national chauvinism and pious cant. Their popular culture is
thoroughly commercialized and debased. Alain Touraine has presented a subtle
argument to the effect that "the extension of domination to the whole of
social and cultural life" obliges us to reconceive class relations. A new
importance has accrued to the class relations of age groups, including "the young."13 Does this
mean that youth is a class, in the sense of historical materialism?
Youth is Not a Class
The 'generation gap' is not a class phenomenon. This has been recognized
by the proponents of the concept -- indeed its opposition to class analysis is
its very raison d'etre.14 Moreover, the category `youth' per se does
not stand in a class relationship to any exploiting class, nor is it a class
which exploits another.15 Consider the first possibility. Are youth
exploited as a class? Many youth have been and still are exploited in their
labor by others -- by tribal patriarchs, the Oriental despot's officials,
slave-masters, feudal lords, and capitalists.16 But not all youth are
exploited; moreover, those who are exploited, are so as members (and along with
other members) of some specifically `exploited' class -- domestic slaves,
chattel slaves, serfs, and wage-laborers. Thus youth per se is not an exploited
class, even though many young people are exploited in their labor.
[387/388]
Consider the second possibility. Are youth an exploiting
class? Children, certainly, and many youth depend for their subsistence upon the
labor of their parents and kin. But the content of a relationship of dependency
can be nurturant or neglectful or oppressive or exploitative; the dependency of
children and youth upon parents tends to be nurturing, neglecting, or oppressing
of the offspring, but not exploiting of the parents. On the one hand, both
parents and offspring are members of the same class -- most parents and
offspring in the several forms of antagonistic society are members of one of the
specifically exploited classes mentioned above. And exploitation is a
relationship between classes, not among persons.17 For instance, it
is not the case that the capitalists and working class youth are both exploiting
working class adults. The capitalist class is exploiting the working class --
adults and youth; employed, underemployed, and unemployed; all the members of
this class thereby have a lower standard of living. On the other hand, youth
cannot be a class which exploits another, by virtue of the exploitation of the
labor of many youth, already noted. Exploitation is, on the classical
formulation, not a transitive relationship. Thus youth per se is not an
exploiting class. If the `generation gap' is not a class phenomenon, is it
instead a 'cultural universal'?
The 'Generation
Gap' is Not a 'Cultural Universal'
This is politically and ideologically a significant question, especially if
social unrest, conflict, etc. can be attributed to an ahistorical factor rather
than to strictly historical social antagonism. Does every culture incorporate
the conflict of generations within its `patterns of behavior'? There are two
significations of universal. (1) The term can mean `all known cases.' That is an
`empirical universal,' and can rather easily be established by descriptive
techniques.18 But empirical universality is a rather weak claim. The
claim "all swans are white" was the schoolman's famous example of a
`universal.' It proved to be only empirical, and in modern times even to be
false, when the species Cygnus atratus
was discovered in Australia. The inadequacy of empirical universality leads to
the other signification of the term. (2) 'Universal' can mean 'necessary in all
cases.' That is a 'true universal' and, compared with the empirical universal,
it can be established only with [388/389] difficulty. Depending on one's
scientific or ideological purposes, establishing a true universal may be
worthwhile.19 Let
us return now to the question of the universality of the 'generation gap.'
Bearing in mind the difference between empirical and true
universality, there are two ways to address this question. On the one hand, we
can inquire if every culture at some point in time -- say today -- incorporates
the 'generation gap.' That is a synchronic
approach to the question. On the other hand, we can ask the more difficult
question whether all cultures through history and pre-history have incorporated
the 'generation gap.' That is a diachronic
approach to the question. Let us consider each in turn.
Margaret Mead has provided an affirmative answer to the
synchronic question. She claims that "the generation gap is world
wide." But someone might inquire further whether the world wide appearances
of the generation gap are evidence of the same latent conflict between the
generations, or are there several sorts of conflict? Mead acknowledges that the
conflict between the generations has "particular forms" in
"different countries," yet they are united, she continues, since
"youthful activism is common to them all."20
But that is an empirical claim, therefore relatively weak. Moreover,
Mead's claim can hardly be strengthened by the establishment of necessity.
Because the universality she describes, whether accurately or not, is unique.
"The situation that has brought about this radical [rupture between the
generations] will not occur again in any such drastic form in the foreseeable
future."21
Hence we conclude that Mead's affirmation of the
universality of the generation gap, here and now, is at best an empirical claim.
Its necessity cannot be established due to her historicist position. In
particular, the appearances of the `generation gap' likely have a plurality of
"explanatory principles." In some locations such as the United States,
these appearances manifest the conflict of generations. In other locations,
these appearances are `show,' i.e. emulative behaviors rather than
manifestations of conflict. Youth around the world wear `Bluejeans.' Hence we
have no basis for affirming that the `generation gap' is a synchronic `cultural
universal' in any strong sense of the terms.
What about the diachronic question? Again Mead responds
affirmatively. She speaks of "the reappearance in every generation
[389/390] of the oedipal challenge to male authority."22 Here we
see the obverse of the inadequacy of the treatment of the synchronic question.
Dissatisfaction with mere empirical universality leads to attempts to establish
true universality at the organismic, the biological level. And this has
typically meant a turn to the formulations of Sigmund Freud. In 1928, Karl
Mannheim had criticized "the usual kind of theory which starts from
naturalism and then abruptly lands in the most extreme kind of
spiritualism."23 Freudianism
provides an excellent illustration of the way `naturalism' gives rise to
spiritualism.
The `generation gap' requires, on Mead's account, a
diachronically universal oedipal complex. And her account is illustrative of the
prevalent approach to this topic. Freud held that the human organism was a
libidinal `economy' which maintained a long-term physiological and psychic
equilibrium by accumulating energy and periodically discharging a series of
`innate drives.' In the `pre-genital' stage of ontogeny, the organism lacks an
object of cathexis. Instead, the organism discharges (his) energies towards the
competitor for the desired cathectic object, viz his own father.24
Thus the "oedipal challenge" and its `biologically based'
pretense to universality.
But the universality of the "oedipal challenge"
is surely dubious, in two senses. On the one hand, Freud reified his concepts,
including those of the oedipal complex. Even so sympathetic a Freudian as Philip
Reiff comments that "Freud's habit of synecdoche ... puts a grave limit on
his theory of knowing."25 Thus it was necessary that Freud's
interpretations be subjected to the most substantial revisions -- even by
psychoanalysts such as Erich Fromm who had faith that Freud was "ever the
sincere thinker" and that he "always offers us undistorted data."26
On the other hand, it has recently become evident that Freud was not a sincere thinker -- he systematically distorted his data. The Freud archives, recently opened, reveal that Freud knew full well that "Dora" and his other case studies, limited in number though they were, represented the widespread incidence of childhood sexual abuse. But Freud's published accounts of these cases rejected the real etiology of neurosis, actual child neglect and abuse (especially sexual abuse), for the fantastic doctrine of an oedipal complex.27 [390/391] Social scientists might well study the etiology of Freud's bizarre doctrines and frauds -- but scarcely can they utilize his falsifications in their own scientific work.28 Thus we have no basis for affirming that the `generation gap' is a diachronic `cultural universal' on the basis of the "oedipal challenge."
Hence the `generation gap' does not seem to be a `cultural universal' any more than a class phenomenon. What then are generations? They are the moment of finitude within the continuity of the species. Perhaps the consideration of the `generation gap' within the sphere of productive (class) relations and that of cultural objects is misguided. Let us consider instead its place among the conditions of societal reproduction.
The Necessity of the
Rupture for Antagonistic Society
It is necessary for youth in the
antagonistic social order to break with their consanguine families so they can
establish their own conjugal families. This rupture is a necessary condition of
societal reproduction. There are several characteristics of the antagonistic
social order which tend to necessitate this rupture: (a) patriarchal relations
and (b) spatial limitations.29 Moreover there is an additional
characteristic which contributes to the rupture, perhaps as significantly as the
pair just mentioned, but specifically within capitalism: (c) ubiquitous
occupational change.30 Let us consider each of these in turn.
Patriarchal relations tend to necessitate the rupture
between youth and parents for two reasons. First, the young man cannot act
autonomously when he is dominated by the patriarch. Only by a material rupture
-- either through the death of the father or the migration of the son -- could
the youth act out his manhood. Second, without that sort of rupture,
disaffection tended to occur between the generations anyhow, since the youth
would become increasingly resentful as he became increasingly frustrated. Recall
Absalom's revolt against his father, David (II Sam. XV-XVII). Only through the break with patriarchy can the
societal reproduction of patriarchy be assured.
Spatial limitations of a social formation which observes
property in land also tend to necessitate a rupture between youth and parents.
The patriarchal demand for an heir and for laborers [391/392] could generate a
surfeit of sons. Only by a material rupture -- through the migration of the
excess sons -- could the estate be inherited intact, and societal reproduction
be assured. Again, the anticipation by the many of the inheritance by the one
could generate disaffection.
Finally, the occupational change which accompanied
capitalism tended to necessitate a rupture between parents and youth. In
pre-capitalist social forms, domestic relations were the material conditions for
the intergenerational transmission of knowledge. As objectionable as it may have
been to the social philosophers, father instructed son while mother instructed
daughter. The apprentice system shifted the persons but not the personae; the
apprentice became a `family member' in the master's household. Intergenerational
occupational change was still unusual; intragenerational change of occupation
was almost unknown. But the coming of early capitalism transformed all this.
Thereafter, the constant "revolutionizing of the instruments of production,
and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of
society" meant continuing occupational change.31
Both inter- and even intra-generational change became frequent if not
popular. But this necessitated a break between young and old, many times
vicinally as well as socially. As though making a virtue out of necessity,
Western sociologists praise the `functional adequacy' of the `nuclear family'
and the residential pattern of `neo-locality.'32
Hence general characteristics of the antagonistic social
order, plus the intergenerational occupational change which is endemic to
capitalist society, tend to necessitate a rupture between youth and their
parents, as a condition of societal reproduction. But there is another side to
this dialectic.
The Sufficiency of
the Rupture for Antagonistic Society
The rupture between youth and their parents tends to be sufficient for the societal reproduction of the antagonistic social
order. This sufficiency can be considered in its objective moment and in its subjective
moment. On the objective side, the estrangement of parents from youth creates
conditions of civil society and ultimately of commodity exchange, which
contribute to social antagonism. On the subjective side, the articulation of
patterns of [392/393] descent with patriarchal domination also contributes to
social antagonism. We will consider both.
By the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Hegel had
already schematized the emergence of civil society out of the intergenerational
transfer of the family estate. The family estate is partitioned among the heirs,
the children, at the appropriate time in the family-cycle. 33
This process of partition and individuation within the consanguine family
develops into the diremption of civil society.34
Notice that Hegel has only indicated necessary conditions for the `system
atomistic' of civil society. It is the reduction of `personal space' which
generates the sufficient conditions.
On Hegel's conception, woman's "surrender" of her
personal property, her personal space, through marriage on behalf of the
conjugal family's estate gives rise to the privatized property of civil society.35
This society has an external moment in which the male
family heads interrelate, and an internal moment in which patriarchal domination
prevails. Thus it incorporates the dehumanized social relations of civil society
on the one hand, and those of the crippled and mutually "mysterious"
personalities of the nuclear family on the other.
Although Hegel only briefly alludes to it, the supersession
of personal property and its willful alienation into family property, and the
increasingly necessary alienation of labor power in civil society ultimately
entail the transformation of the commoditization of the thing into the
commoditization of the person and the human's capacities -- i.e. into human
alienation.36 `Personal space' tends to be supplanted by the
`metrical space' of the value form. Thus social antagonism is reproduced by the
objective processes of society -- by `objective Geist'.
Let us turn to the subjective side, where the articulation
of descent and domination can be seen to promote social antagonism. There are
several patterns of descent, two of which are of particular interest: matriliny,
where descent is traced through the mother's side, and patriliny,
where it is traced through the father's side. There are also several patterns of
domestic domination, including matrifocality,
where egalitarian conditions prevail between the sexes, and patriarchy,
where male dominance prevails. These patterns combine into three social forms:
[393/394]
matriliny X matrifocality = the `egalitarian gens;'
matriliny X patriarchy = the `avunculate;' and
patriliny X patriarchy = the `patriarchal form.'
We will return in the conclusion to an assessment of the first of these possibilities.
As David Schneider has pointed out, the second of these possibilities results in the alienation of the young male from his consanguine family (his `matrilineal descent group') as well as from his conjugal family (his offspring).37 Likewise, the third of these possibilities results in the equally severe alienation of the young woman from her consanguine family; as Schneider has put it, under the patriarchal form, "the bonds between a woman and her own unit can be practically severed."38 Moreover, the patriarchal form tends to alienate women from their offspring through the transition to patrilineality; the child becomes the possession of the male.
Either of these alienations, that of the young man or the young woman, can contribute to social antagonism. The alienation of the young man in the avunculate is illustrated by the tale of Jacob and Esau in Genesis. Esau came to be alienated from his parents, Isaac and Rebecca, when he married the "daughters of Canaan," i.e. he married outside his matrilineal descent group (Gen. XXVI:34-35). Indeed, this episode provides a cogent rationale for the transfer of Esau's birthright to Jacob, first by barter for a bowl of lentil soup, then by outright fraud (Gen. XXV:29-34; XXVII). The struggle over property rights is direct evidence of social antagonism.
Young Jacob was alienated from his conjugal family through
the machinations of his maternal uncle Laban. Recall that Laban exploited his
nephew throughout Jacob's sojourn in Padan-aram. During that period Jacob
married Laban's daughters, first the fecund Leah and then the favored Rachel (Gen.
XXIX-XXXI). Jacob came to be alienated not only from Laban and his sons, but
from Leah and Jacob's offspring by her. Jacob favored Rachel's son Joseph over
his firstborn by Leah, Reuben (cf. also Gen.
XXXIII:1-2). Little wonder Joseph's brothers sent him down to Egypt. Thus Esau's
`generational revolt' against Isaac's wishes, [394/395] conjoined to Jacob's
against Laban, tended to maintain the antagonistic social order.
The alienation of the young woman within the patriarchal
tribal form is related to primitive warfare, and thereby to the reproduction of
the antagonistic social order. In their cross-cultural studies of residency
patterns in primitive society, Carol and Melvin Ember have shown that
patrilocality is associated with intratribal warfare, while matrilocality is
associated with intertribal warfare. Mobilization for war is more problematic
when enemies are near, as presumably they are in the case of intratribal
warfare. The warriors must therefore be concentrated, hence the need for
patrilocality.39 This would tend to alienate young women from their
consanguine families.
The conjunction of intratribal warfare and patrilocality
raise the likelihood that the young woman will find her husband pitted against
her kin. Will she join the fray? If so, on which side? This contradiction is
resolved by systematically disarming
women -- under those conditions, they are excluded from participating in
primitive warfare. Thus women in the patriarchal tribal form are alienated not
only from their consanguine family but from their conjugal family as well. Once
subordinated, their relation to the men of the formation remains that of an
exploited group. Thus the rupture between youth, both male and female, and their
parents tends to be sufficient, both in objective and subjective terms, for the
reproduction of the antagonistic social order.
Conclusion
The relationship of the `generation gap' to the antagonistic social order is
thus both intimate and intricate. The `generation gap' does not appear to be a
`cultural universal' in any stong sense of the term, so the conflict of
generations can be expected to decline and eventually vanish with the progress
of humanity. But the elements of generational relations -- youth and elders,
parents and children -- do not constitute classes per se, hence are not the
agents of historical change. Only the working class has that potential.
When private property in the means of production is abolished, parental possession of children as property will begin to disappear as well. Childrearing will become fully humanized; child abuse [395/396] and neglect will become nothing more than stunning historical reminders of the decadence of capitalism. Thereupon the rupture of youth from their consanguine and conjugal families will become unnecessary, along with patriarchal domination and the ownership and inheritance of land. The forms and variety of family life will flourish, undoubtedly including both the `single parent family' and the `pairing family,' as well as other sex-egalitarian forms as well. And the healing of that rupture will mean that the `system atomistic' of civil society will be transcended at last.
Notes
1. Peter Blos "The
Generation Gap: Fact and Fiction" in Adolescent
Psychiatry: Annals of the American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, Vol.
1. NY: Basic Books (1970); also Vern Bengston "The Generation Gap: A Review
and Typology of Social-Psychological Perspectives" Youth
and Society Vol. 2 (1970), pp. 7-32.
2. Lewis Feuer The
Conflict of Generations NY: Basic Books (1969), p. 10.
3. Lewis Feuer "Generations
and the Theory of Revolution" Survey
(1972) No. 3 (84), p. 163; he introduces a `scientific' notion of
"generational equilibrium" in Conflict
of Generations, pp. 318-319.
4. Feuer Conflict of Generations, pp. 126-127.
5. Kingsley Davis "The
Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict" American
Sociological Review (1940), Vol. 5, pp. 523-534.
6. See Auguste Comte The
Positive Philosophy (trans. H. Martineau) London: John Chapman (1853), Vol.
2, pp. 152-154; John Stuart Mill A System
of Logic [1843], Bk. VI, Chap. x, in Collected
Works Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1974), Vol. VIII; Antoine Cournot Considrations
sur la marche des idees Paris: Hachette (1872), Bk. I, Chap. 8; and Emile
Durkheim De la division du travail social
[1893] Paris: Presses universitaires de France (1973), pp. 279 ff. But see the
positivist Vilfredo Pareto A Treatise on
General Sociology NY: Harcourt, Brace and Co. (1935), � 2230.
7. Max Stirner [Caspar Schmidt] The
Ego and His Own NY: Dover Books (1973), pp. 9-11.
8. Karl Marx and F. Engels The
German Ideology, in Collected Works,
NY: International Publishers (1976), Vol. 5, p. 129; see also V.I. Dobrenkov Neo-Freudians in Search of `Truth' Moscow: Progress Publishers
(1976), pp. 18-20 for a similar comment about Freud. [396/397]
9. James Legge (ed.) The
Works of Mencius Oxford: Clarendon Press (1895), Bk. IV, Pt. I, Chaps.
xviii-xix; pp. 308-309.
10. By "antagonistic social
order," we mean the series of social formations which move in their
antagonistic social relations: the patriarchal tribal, the Asiatic, the Ancient
slave, the feudal, and the capitalist formations; see Marx and Engels Collected
Works, Vol. 5, pp. 32-35, 64-74: "These different forms are just so
many forms of the organization of labor, and hence of property." Also K.
Marx and F. Engels Selected Works,
Moscow: FLPH (1962), Vol. 1, p. 363. This series is preceded by a
pre-antagonistic social order and is followed by a non-antagonistic social
order; see Gordon Welty "The Materialist Science of Culture and the
Critique of Ideology," Quarterly
Journal of Ideology, Vol. 5 (1981), pp. 7-8.
11. See William Mariner An
Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands in the South Pacific Ocean
London: Constable and Co.(1827) and Lawrence Stone The
Family, Sex and Marriage in England: 1500-1800 NY: Harper and Row (1979), p.
471.
12. Murray Straus et
al, Behind Closed Doors NY: Anchor Books (1981), pp. 102-121.
13. Alain Touraine The
Self-production of Society Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1977), pp.
160-161; see the suggestive remarks of Karl Mannheim "The Problem of
Generations" Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul (1952), p. 288 ff.
14. E.g. Feuer "Generations
and the Theory of Revolution" p. 171: "underlying the manifest content
of the Bolshevik Revolution, the class and socialist revolutions, there was a
latent reality, scarcely avowed, of a generational revolution." Yet Feuer
had earlier held that "generational struggle demands categories of
understanding unlike those which enable us to understand class struggle,"
and "the dynamic of generational revolt ran a course different from that of
working class discontent;" cf. Conflict
of Generations, p. 10 and p. 126. Davis likewise sought a generational unity
of "revolutions" (which he defined as "an abrupt form of societal
alteration"), and thereby postulated the similarity of Soviet Russia and
Nazi Germany; see his "Sociology of Parent-Youth Conflict," p. 524.
15. We use
"exploitation" in the classical sense of the term; see Frederick
Engels Anti-Duhring Moscow: FLPH
(1962), p. 287.
16. The labor force participation rate in the United States for a random sample of young men aged 16-17 in 1968 was 66-69%; for young women aged 15-19, it was 38-42%. See U.S. Department of Labor Manpower Research Monograph Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (1971), No. 16, Vol. 3, pp. 17-18, and Manpower Research Monograph Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (1978), No. 24, Vol. 4, pp.14-19. See also Robert Michael and Nancy Tuma "Youth Employment: Does Life Begin at 16?" Paper presented before the Population Association of America, Pittsburgh, PA (1983).
17. Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 364 point out that they do not use "antagonism" (or "exploitation") in the sense of individual antagonism, but in the sense of collective antagonism -- that "arising from the social conditions of life."
18. For instance, Steven
Goldberg has asserted the universality of patriarchy, of male dominance, and of
marriage. On close inspection, he means that every [397/398] culture so far
described by the ethnographers, approximately 1200 out of a universe of more
than 4000 known cultures, presents these three characteristics; see his Inevitability
of Patriarchy NY: William Morrow (1973), p. 31-33, p. 61.
19. Thus Goldberg is evidently
uncomfortable with the weakness of the empirical universality of his claims
about patriarchy and male dominance. So he seeks to find hormonal differences
between the sexes which would necessitate these universals; see Inevitability
of Patriarchy, Chaps. 3-5 Unfortunately for his argument, Goldberg depends
upon the work of John Money, who flatly repudiates such patriarchal apologetics;
see John Money Love and Love Sickness
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (1980), Chaps. 7-8, esp. p. 142:
"There is no conclusive evidence that either chromosomes or hormones have a
direct part to play in regulating the ratio of dominance and submission in an
erotic partnership between a man and a woman."
20. Margaret Mead Culture
and Commitment NY: Natural History Press (1970), pp. 53-54. There is an
important ideological implication of such a quest for universals, even if only
empirical ones -- these universals are sought on the basis of antagonistic
society; this amounts to the denial of existing socialist societies.
21. Mead, p. 61.
22. Mead, pp. 13-14.
23. Mannheim "The Problem
of Generations" p. 311.
24. See also Otto Fenichel The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis NY: W.W. Norton (1945). This `hydraulic' conception of an economy was quite popular in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The reactionary economist, Irving Fisher, even constructed a working model; see his Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Price [1892] New Haven: Yale University Press (1925).
25. Philip Reiff Freud: The Mind of the Moralist Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1979), p. 51.
26. Erich Fromm The Crisis of Psychoanalysis Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett (1970), p. 91; Fromm's "Comments on the Case of Little Hans," loc. cit. is an excellent example of such an `de-reifying' reconsideration of a Freudian case study.
27. See Jeffrey Masson The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (1983); also Ralph Blumenthal "New Light Shed on Freud's Sex Theory Reversal" The New York Times (August 25, 1981), Section III. Freud first publicly rejected the role of sexual abuse of children in the development of neuroses in a September 21, 1897 letter to Wm. Fliess; his first published statement of that rejection was in "My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses" [1906] Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works London: Hogarth Press (1966), Vol. 7, p. 271 ff.
28. An excellent case in point is that of the celebrated British psychologist, Sir Cyril Burt, who has recently been revealed to have fabricated his data on intelligence [398/399] and class; see D.D. Dorfman "The Cyril Burt Question" Science Vol. 201 (1978), pp. 1177-1186.
29. Cf. Oscar Handlin and Mary
F. Handlin Facing Life Boston: Little,
Brown and Co. (1971), pp. 7-10.
30. Cf. also Mead, p. 52.
31. Cf. Marx and Engels Collected
Works, Vol. 6. p. 487; Engels had provided an early discussion of this
transformation and its sequelae in The Condition of the Working-Class in England [1845]; see Collected
Works, Vol. 4, p. 307 ff. and Steven Marcus Engels,
Manchester and the Working Class NY: Random House (1974), p. 134 ff.
32. See Wm. Goode World Revolution and Family Patterns NY: Free Press (1970).
33. G.W.F. Hegel Werke
Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag (1970), Bd. 7 [1821], � 178; see also Adam
Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments Oxford: Clarendon Press (1976), p.
223.
34. Hegel, � 181.
35. Hegel, � 167.
36. Hegel, � 66.
37. David Schneider "The
Distinctive Features of Matrilineal Descent Groups" in D.M. Schneider and
K. Gough (eds.) Matrilineal Kinship
Berkeley: University of California Press (1961), p. 10, pp. 22-23.
38. Schneider, ibid, p. 18.
39. Melvin Ember and Carol Ember
"The Conditions Favoring Matrilocal Versus Patrilocal Residence" American
Anthropologist Vol. 73 (1971), pp. 571-594; see also David Adams "Why
There Are So Few Women Warriors" Behavioral
Science Research Vol. 18:3 (1983)
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