Valladolid Debate, 1550.

Was the conquest and dispossession and enslavement of Americans justified?

[--from Disrupting the Discourse of Conquest: The Suppression of Sep�lveda 
by Anne M. DeLong]

Sep�lveda's Four Points

Sep�lveda's first argument appeals to the doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas and to Aristotle's theory of natural slavery to suggest that Native Americans are barbarians and therefore must submit to Spanish governance:

�For those are frankly called barbarians,� as Thomas maintains, �who are lacking in rational power either on account of an environment from which dullness for the most part is found or due to some evil habit by which men become like brutes,� and furthermore races of this sort by right of nature ought to obey those who are more civilized, prudent, and outstanding so that they may be governed by better customs and usages.  (9)

Referring to the precedence of Roman rule, Sep�lveda suggests an inevitability to the process of conquest as a sort of ongoing natural law.

Sep�lveda's second point justifying war is the charge that these "barbarians" commit crimes against the law of nature, namely, idolatry and human sacrifice.  Attempting to find some traction on the slippery slope of the argument that "all mortal sins are contrary to the law of nature" (15), since obviously members of the conquering race could not claim sinlessness, Sep�lveda here makes an interesting move:

that nation is to be understood as not keeping the law of nature in which any mortal sin is not considered a shameful act, but rather publicly approved, such as the murder of innocent people who were sacrificed in many localities and prevalent idolatry, which is the most serious of sins, is approved among these barbarians.  (15)

Thus Sep�lveda acknowledges a degree of autonomy of native customs and cultures which he uses against itself by suggesting that a society that sanctions a certain behavior can be held liable for infractions against natural law, while a society that outlaws such practices complies with natural law, regardless of the infractions of that society's individuals (i.e., the Spaniards).  Similarly, with regard to conquest discourse as a whole, the implication seems to be that a society can cover itself by adopting an official practice that qualifies conquest while allowing individuals to operate in an unchecked fashion.  Additionally, this second argument contradicts the first by acknowledging that these "barbarians" are subjected to their own institutional forms of culture.

In making his third point, that Spanish intervention will save thousands of potential victims of human sacrifice, Sep�lveda stresses a monstrosity so abhorrent that it leads "upright men" to doubt whether the natives can be converted (17).  Yet throughout he maintains conversion as the single goal of conquest, a perfect illustration of the way in which conquest discourse pays lip service to high ideals, while conquest practice is driven by less lofty motivations and assumptions.

Sep�lveda develops his fourth point at great length, the controversial argument that the driving need to save Native souls even against their will justifies the use of force.  It is here that Sep�lveda makes an appeal to expediency that aligns his argument more closely with conquest practice as opposed to conquest theory.  Repeated references to the removal of obstacles to the propagation of the faith take on ominous significance when one considers how often the obstacles removed were the individuals themselves.  In this section Sep�lveda counters charges of his methods as being antithetical to Christ's example by appealing to a might-makes-right philosophy and the increased power of the Church and Christian princes.  According to Sep�lveda, as practice has taught and continues to teach, force is the most expedient means to subdue people.

Although he does not refer to the Requerimiento specifically, Sep�lveda dismisses the requirement of providing prior warning as a useless hindrance to conquest.  Correctly recognizing the travesty inherent in shouting legalities in Spanish at uncomprehending natives, and even acknowledging that no one is likely to submit under such circumstances, Sep�lveda proposes eliminating the practice of prior warning, anticipating and reflecting actual conquest practice. 
 

Las Casas's Response: A Brief Account

Las Casas's response to Sep�lveda is lengthy and intricate, but a brief discussion of a few of his points will suffice here to establish the tenor of the opposing argument.  In countering Sep�lveda's first charge of Indian barbarism, Las Casas identifies four distinct types of barbarians, the first of which he defines by barbaric behavior:

First, barbarian in the loose and broad sense of the word means any cruel, inhuman, wild, and merciless man acting against human reason out of anger or native disposition, so that, putting aside decency, meekness, and humane moderation, he becomes hard, severe, quarrelsome, unbearable, cruel, and plunges blindly into crimes that only the wildest beasts of the forest would commit (In Defense 28-29).

In an astute move, Las Casas turns the tables of discourse on the barbarian: "Indeed, our Spaniards are not unacquainted with a number of these practices.  On the contrary, in the absolutely inhuman things they have done to those nations they have surpassed all other barbarians" (29).

In countering Sep�lveda's second charge regarding Indian crimes against natural law, Las Casas goes so far as to suggest that even cannibalism is not intrinsically evil in cases of necessity and extreme hunger.  Elsewhere, in his Brief Account of the Devastation of the Indies, Las Casas tells the lurid tale of a human abattoir sanctioned by Spanish conquerors in which natives are forced to perform cannibalism.   While as unverifiable as other charges of Native cannibalism, this account may serve as a metaphor for the way in which the Native is figuratively "made" a cannibal by propagandist accounts of barbarianism.

Las Casas troubles the logic of Sep�lveda's third argument on conquest as the salvation of the innocent by considering its practical execution, noting that in an actual war it is impossible to separate the oppressed from the oppressors.  Finally, the overarching premise of Las Casas's position is his opposition to Sep�lveda's most controversial position: that conversion can and should be effected by force.  Arguing throughout his many treatises for a kinder, gentler conversion, Las Casas never once questions the Christianizing mission itself . . .