Hildegard was a German noblewoman who became a
Benedictine abbess. She was mystic, which means that she had visions and
heard the voice of God directly, which allowed her to understand the scriptures
and write about the spiritual truths with a special authority that was
recognized in her day. St. Thomas was a scholastic. He benefitted
from the reintroduction of the texts of Aristotle and Plato from the Muslim
world. He attempted to use the rational methods of the ancient Greeks to
arrive at a systematic concept of God's creation.
Below we have two sets of readings from each author to compare. The first
concerns the creation of women. The second relates to the connection
between body and soul. In each case, compare both the methods and
conclusions of each author. In this exercise, you are asked to read both
these great medieval thinkers on a key topic of interest in those days, the
relation of body and soul.
Hildegard:
Zeal for goodness is like a day when we can
ponder everything in our mind, while laziness is like a night where we can no
longer see anything at all. Just as the night is often moonlit and then later
overshadowed if the moon goes under, our deeds are all mixed up. Sometimes they
are luminous and at other times they are dark.
If our soul, under the body's urging, does
evil with the body, the power of our soul will be darkened, because the light
of the truth is missing. But if later the soul feels humiliated by sin and
rises up again in opposition to the desires of the flesh, it will henceforth
harry that flesh and hinder its evil deeds....
Indeed, the soul sustains the flesh, just as
the flesh sustains the soul. For, after all, every deed is accomplished by the
soul and the flesh. And, therefore, the soul can achieve with the body good and
holy things and be revived as a result.
In this connection, it often happens that our
flesh may feel bored when it cooperates with the soul. In such a case,
therefore, the soul may give in to its fleshly partner and let the flesh take
delight in earthly things. Similarly, a mother knows how to get her crying
child to laugh again. Thus the soul accomplishes good deeds with the body. even
though there may be some evil mixed up with them. The soul lets this happen so
as not to overburden the flesh too much.
St. Thomas: (The Summa Theologica, Benziger Bros. edition, 1947--altered)
Note on
reading St. Thomas: He has a special system for presenting logical arguments in
this sequence:
1. Lists arguments
against his position, called "objections"
2. offers contrary arguments
for his position
3. States his
argument
4. Lists replies to
the original objections against his argument
To help clarify things,
the central argument is underlined. The instructor has also changed some words
to make the argument clearer.
Whether the appetites of desire or avoidance obey reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the appetites of desire or avoidance
do not obey reason. For they are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not
obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De
Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the appetites of desire or avoidance do not obey
reason.
Objection 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist
it. But the appetites of desire or avoidance resist reason: according to the
Apostle (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the
law of my mind." Therefore the appetites of desire or avoidance do not
obey reason.
Objection 3: Further, as the appetites are inferior to the rational
part of the soul, so also is the senses. But the senses of the soul do not obey
reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like
manner, neither do the powers of the sensory appetite . . . obey reason.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that
"the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided
into concupiscence (desire) and anger."
I answer that, In two ways the power of desire or avoidance obey
the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as
to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own
acts, because in other animals the sensory appetite is naturally moved by
the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is
afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Question [78],
Article [4]), is replaced by the cogitative (reasoning) power, which is called
by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions.
Wherefore in man the sensory appetite is naturally moved by this particular
reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according
to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic (logical) matters particular conclusions are drawn
from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason
directs the sensory appetite, which is divided into desiring and avoiding; and
this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from
universal principles is not the work of the intellect as such, but of the
reason: hence it is that the appetites of desire or avoidance are said to obey
the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in
himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the
like may be modified or excited.
To the will also is the sensory appetite subject in execution,
which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement
follows at once the appetites of desire or avoidance: for instance, the sheep,
fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting
appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the appetites
of desire or avoidance: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the
superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers,
the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is
not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this
is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite
moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this
way, therefore, desire or avoidance are subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in
what is proper to it as a sensory power. But the avoidance and desiring powers
denominate the sensory appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they
are led by the reason, as we have said.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher (Aristotle) says (Polit.
i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for
the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates
the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called despotic
whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the
orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But
that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects,
who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something
of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who
commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power,
because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul,
but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally
moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is
said to rule desiring and avoiding by a politic power: because the sensory
appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands
of reason. For the sensory appetite is naturally moved, not only by the
estimative power in other animals, and in man by the thinking power which the
universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is
that we experience that the powers of desire and avoidance do resist reason,
inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or
unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that desire and
avoidance resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not
obey.
Reply to Objection 3: The exterior senses require for action
exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which
is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetites and thinking,
do not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of
reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetites,
but can also form the fantasies of the imagination.