Hildegard of Bingen
(1098-1179) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)
Hildegard was a German
noblewoman who became a Benedictine
abbess.
She was mystic, which means that she had visions and heard the voice of
God directly, which allowed her to understand the scriptures and write
about the spiritual truths with special authority that was recognized
in
her day. St. Thomas was a scholastic. He benefitted from
the reintroduction of the texts of Aristotle and Plato from the Muslim
world. He attempted to use the rational methods of the ancient
Greeks to arrive at a systematic concept of God's creation.
Below we have two sets of readings from each author to compare.
The first concerns the creation of women. The second relates to
the connection between body and soul. In each case, compare both
the methods and conclusions of each author. How similar or
different are their conclusions, and to what extent to these
differences arise from their different methods?
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A. Compare the following passage from Hildegard with St. Thomas's
argument on p. 247 of your text.
When God looked upon the human countenance, God was exceedingly
pleased.
For had not God created humanity according to the divine image and
likeness?
Human beings were to announce all God's wondrous works by means of
their
tongues that were endowed with reason. For humanity is God's complete
work....
But the human species still needed a support that was a match for
it.
So God gave the first man a helper in the form of woman, who was man's
mirror image, and in her the whole human race was present in a latent
way.
God did this with manifold creative power, just as God had produced in
great power the first man.
Man and woman are in this way so involved with each other that one
of
them is the work of the other. Without woman, man could not be called
man;
without man, woman could not be named woman. Thus woman is the work of
man, while man is a sight full of consolation for woman. Neither of
them
could henceforth live without the other. Man is in this connection an
indication
of the Godhead while woman is an indication of the humanity of God's
Son.
And thus the human species sits on the judgment seat of the world.
It
rules over all creation.
B. Compare the following
statements. The first is a selection from Hildegard, followed by
some selections from Thomas
Hildegard:
Zeal for goodness is like a day when we can ponder everything in our
mind, while laziness is like a night where we can no longer see
anything
at all. Just as the night is often moonlit and then later overshadowed
if the moon goes under, our deeds are all mixed up. Sometimes they are
luminous and at other times they are dark.
If our soul, under the body's urging, does evil with the body. the
power
of our soul will be darkened, because the light of the truth is
missing.
But if later the soul feels humiliated by sin and rises up again in
opposition
to the desires of the flesh, it will henceforth harry that flesh and
hinder
its evil deeds....
Indeed, the soul sustains the flesh, just as the flesh sustains the
soul. For, after all, every deed is accomplished by the soul and the
flesh.
And, therefore, the soul can achieve with the body good and holy things
and be be revived as a result.
In this connection, it often happens that our flesh may feel bored
when
it cooperates with the soul. In such a case, therefore, the soul may
give
in to its fleshly partner and let the flesh take delight in earthly
things.
Similarly, a mother knows how to get her crying child to laugh again.
Thus
the soul accomplishes good deeds with the body. even though there may
be
some evil mixed up with them. The soul lets this happen so as not to
overburden
the flesh too much.
St. Thomas:
(The Summa Theologica,
Benziger Bros. edition, 1947)
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Whether the soul is man?
Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is
written (2 Cor. 4:16): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the
inward man is renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the
soul. Therefore the soul is the inward man.
Objection 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it
is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance.
Therefore it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human
person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.
On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends
Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but
both soul and body."
I answer that, The assertion "the soul is man," can be
taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular
man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and
body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to
the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the
species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs
what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition
does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in
natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate
matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter.
For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed
of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the
notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever
belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained
under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species.
It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is
this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation
of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because
in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would
belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to
a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of
a man is man. But it has been shown above (Article [3]) that sensation
is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an
operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a
soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through
supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to
be a soul making use of the body.
Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic.
ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what
the governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way
sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes,
indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is
called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body
is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go
beyond the senses. And this is called the "outward" man.
Reply to Objection 2: Not every particular substance is a
hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its
species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a
person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part
of the human species.
Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?
(Instructor's Note: In
Thomas's theory, the "concupiscible appetites" are those impulses which
drive animals and people to find things which are pleasant and
congenial, while the "irascible appetites" are those impulses which
drive us away from harm or pain. For our purposes, it is adequate
simply to not worry about the terms, but simply note that Thomas is
speaking about natural appetites of the body.)
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and
concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and
concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey
reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De
Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites
do not obey reason.
Objection 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not
resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason:
according to the Apostle (Rm. 7:23): "I see another law in my members
fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and
concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.
Objection 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior
to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But
the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither
hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do
the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible,
obey reason.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that
"the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is
divided into concupiscence and anger."
I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible
powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and
the will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the
reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive
appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a
sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative
power, as we have said above (Question [78], Article [4]), is replaced
by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular
reason,' because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man
the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason.
But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according
to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular
conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is
clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which
is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys
it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal
principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the
reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to
obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can
experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal
considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.
To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in
execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other
animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible
appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once,
because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man
is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible
appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior
appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers,
the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower
appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher
appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,
11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher
sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, the irascible and
concupiscible are subject to reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the
serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the
irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite
rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as
we have said.
Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i,
2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for
the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect
dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is
called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right
to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since
they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and
royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to
the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own,
by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And
so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the
members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but
at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is
naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the
intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by
a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its
own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the
sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power
in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the
universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence
it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do
resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant,
which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from
the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in
something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.
Reply to Objection 3: The exterior senses require for
action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the
presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both
appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore
they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or
modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the
phantasms of the imagination.