John
Stuart Mill
On Liberty (1859)
Chapter
3--On Individuality, As
One of the Elements of Wellbeing
SUCH being the reasons which make it imperative
that human beings should be free to form opinions, and to express their
opinions without reserve; and such the baneful consequences to the
intellectual, and through that to the moral nature of man, unless this liberty
is either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibition; let us next examine
whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon
their opinions — to carry these out in their lives, without hindrance,
either physical or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it is at their own
risk and peril. This last proviso is of course indispensable. No one pretends
that actions should be as free as opinions. On the contrary, even opinions lose
their immunity, when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as
to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. .
.
The liberty of the individual must be thus far
limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people. But if he
refrains from molesting others in what concerns them, and merely acts according
to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same
reasons which show that opinion should be free, prove also that he should be
allowed, without molestation, to carry his opinions into practice at his own
cost. . .
But the evil is, that individual spontaneity is
hardly recognized by the common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic
worth, or deserving any regard on its own account. The majority, being
satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are (for it is they who make
them what they are), cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough
for everybody; and what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the
majority of moral and social reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy,
as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance
of what these reformers, in their own judgment, think would be best for
mankind. Few persons, out of Germany, even comprehend the meaning of the
doctrine which Wilhelm von Humboldt, so eminent both as a savant and as a
politician, made the text of a treatise — that "the end of man, or
that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and
not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most
harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole;"
that, therefore, the object "towards which every human being must
ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to
influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of
power and development;" that for this there are two requisites,
"freedom, and a variety of situations;" and that from the union of
these arise "individual vigor and manifold diversity," which combine
themselves in " originality."
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all
that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth,
within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human
beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works
partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also
becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to
high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds
every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth
belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each
person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more
valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own
existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass
which is composed of them. As much compression as is necessary to prevent the
stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others,
cannot be dispensed with; but for this there is ample compensation even in the
point of view of human development.
To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops
the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But
to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure,
develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself
in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole
nature. To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that
different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In proportion as
this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to
posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as
Individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism,
by whatever name it may be called, and whether it professes to be enforcing the
will of God or the injunctions of men.