John Locke, Second Treatise on
Government (1690)
CHAP. VII.
Of Political or Civil Society.
. . .
Sect. 87. Man being born, as has been proved,
with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrouled
enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with
any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only
to preserve his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the
injuries and attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of
that law in others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death
itself, in crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires
it. But because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in
itself the power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the
offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is political
society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power,
resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him
not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private
judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be
umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties;
and by men having authority from the community, for the execution of those
rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that
society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those offences which any
member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as the law has
established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in political
society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common
established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide
controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society
one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I mean on earth,
are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no other, judge
for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before shewed
it, the perfect state of nature.
Sect. 88. And thus the common-wealth comes by
a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions
which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society,
(which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to
punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it,
(which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation
of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But
though every man who has entered into civil society, and is become a member of
any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against the
law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the
judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases,
where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the
common-wealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments of the
common-wealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his own judgments,
they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we have the
original of the legislative and executive power of civil society,
which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when
committed within the common-wealth; and also to determine, by occasional
judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries
from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of
all the members, when there shall be need.
Sect. 89. Where-ever
therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every
one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public,
there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this
is done, where-ever any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into
society to make one people, one body politic, under one supreme government; or
else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government
already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or which is all one, the
legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the society
shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own
decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into
that of a common-wealth, by setting up a
judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress
the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is
the legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever
there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive
power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of nature.
Sect. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute
monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is
indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of
civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid,
and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily
follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a known
authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury
received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the* society
ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to
appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons
are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince,
in respect of those who are under his dominion.
__(*The public
power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society; and the
principal use of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which
laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason shewed
which may necessarily inforce, that the law of
reason, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sect. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or rather slave of an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power. __(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by some, whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)
CHAP. IX.
Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.
Sect. 123. IF man in the state of nature be
so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and
possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part
with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and
subject himself to the dominion and controul of any
other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of
nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and
constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as
he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and
justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe,
very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free,
is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he
seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already
united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their
lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.
Sect. 124. The great and chief end,
therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under
government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state
of nature there are man y things wanting.
_ First,
There wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common
measure to decide all controversies between them: for though the law of na ture be plain and intelligible
to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by
their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to
allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their
particular cases.
Sect. 125. Secondly, In the state of
nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to
determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in
that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being
partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far,
and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.
Sect. 126. Thirdly, In
the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the
sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where
they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many
times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who
attempt it.
Sect. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding
all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while
they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to
pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this
state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular
and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the
transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws
of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It
is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of
punishing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst
them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that
purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of
both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and
societies themselves.