John Locke, Second
Treatise on Government (1690)
To understand
political power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what
state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they
think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or
depending upon the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the
power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there
being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the
same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination
or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest
declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an
evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
. .
. . . But because no political society can be, nor subsist,
without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order
thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there
only is political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this
natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that
exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it. And
thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the
same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the
execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between
any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes those
offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such
penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are,
and who are not, in political society together. Those who are united into one
body, and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with
authority to decide controversies between them, and punish offenders, are in
civil society one with another: but those who have no such common appeal, I
mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being, where there is no
other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before showed
it, the perfect state of nature.
And thus the common-wealth comes by a
power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions
which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society,
(which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any
injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is
the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property
of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man
who has entered into civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth,
has thereby quitted his power to punish offences, against the law of nature, in
prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences,
which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to
the magistrate, he has given a right to the common-wealth to employ his force,
for the execution of the judgments of the common-wealth, whenever he shall be
called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself,
or his representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and
executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far
offences are to be punished, when committed within the common-wealth; and also
to determine, by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of
the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated; and in both these
to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall be need.
Hence it is evident, that absolute
monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is
indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of
civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and
remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow
from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority,
to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or
controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey;
where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for
the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in
the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who
are under his dominion.
For he being supposed
to have all, both legislative and executive power in himself alone, there is no
judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and
indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and
redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from
the prince, or by his order. . . .
There is one
more way whereby such a government may be dissolved, and that is when he who
has the supreme executive power neglects and abandons that charge, so that the
laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is demonstrably to
reduce all to anarchy, and so effectually to dissolve the government. For laws not being made for themselves,
but to be by their execution the bonds of the society, to keep every part of
the body politic in its due place and function, when that totally ceases, the
government visibly ceases, and the people become a confused multitude, without
order or connection. . .
In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themselves, by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other by the change of persons or form. . .